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PREFACE 
The Netherlands Government Advisory Council for Social 
Welfare Policy (HRWB) and the Netherlands Scientific Council 
for Government Policy (WRR) jointly organized the 11th 
seminar on the integration of social aspects in macro-eco- 
nomic planning and policy making. 
The meeting, held at the premises of the HRWB at The Hague 
from November 2-4 1988, dealt this time specifically with 
the theme of "The main consequences of changing responsi- 
bilities between the state, the market and the intermediate 
sector for policies of redistribution". 
In this working document the introductory papers and discus- 
sions of the seminar are presented in Part I. Part I1 
presents the other contributions of the participants. At the 
seminar Martin Rein's contribution concerned his booklet 
"The Dutch choice" (in the series "DwarskijkenW, HRWB). 
Therefore, we here only present a short summary. 
Added also are the official.conference program and the list 
of participants. 
The contents of the papers are presented under responsi- 
bility of the authors. The papers were edited only mar- 
ginally. 
The seminar could be successful because of the active con- 
tribution of all participants. We do hope that with this 
seminar a second decade of annual seminars on relevant 
socio-economic policy issues has started. 
The organizing committee: 
Erik de Gier (HRWB) 
Rieneke Meij (HRWB) 
Willem Dercksen (WRR) 
Gerard Kei j zers (WRR) 
The Hague, April 1989 
Opening statement by Joop van der Reijden, Chairman of the 
Government Advisory Council for Social Welfare Policy and 
former Minister of Health 
Ladies en gentlemen, 
It gives me great pleasure to be the opening speaker today. 
I will be speaking on behalf of the WRR (Scientific Council 
for Government Policy) and the HRWB (Government Advisory 
Council for Social Welfare Policy). I understand from the 
organizing committee that the seminar today marks the 11th 
seminar in row on the subject of integration of social 
aspects in macro-economic planning and policy. This is the 
second time the seminar is being held in The Netherlands; 
the first time was in The Hague in 1979. Chairman at that 
time was the Minister of Social Affairs, Wil Albeda, whom 
you can meet at the WRR-reception for participants this 
evening. 
Similar to the first seminar, held in the Netherlands in 
1979, the central topic of this seminar concerns problems on 
the labour market. However, there will be no repetition of 
old facts. The situation on the labour market has changed 
drastically in the last decade. This holds truth not only 
for the Netherlands, but also for the majority of the other 
West-European countries; with the exception of the Nordic 
countries. 
Since the beginning of the eighties unemployment has become 
an actual and persistent problem in many European countries. 
This has not been 'the case since 1945. Especially alarming 
is the fact that the group of long term unemployed is still 
in its growing stage in almost all of the Western European 
countries. This group consists of people who have been out 
of work for over two or three years. 
Nevertheless there are differences which are not only 
interesting but also easy to recognize between the Western 
European countries. Some countries like Norway, Sweden, 
Austria and Switzerland manage to maintain the rate of 
unemployment below five percent in the beginning of the 
eighties. At the other extreme, countries like Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Denmark all have an unemployment rate of 
over ten percent. The situation has hardly changed by now. 
In between these two groups there is a number of countries 
with medium high unemployment rates (between five and ten 
percent). Examples are France, Germany and Finland. 
Presently about half of the total number of the unemployed 
in the Netherlands belong to the group of the long term 
unemployed. The government has tried to diminish this group 
by a number of different policy measures like shortening of 
labour time, a subsidized wage system, training and work 
experience programs. 
At this point the government and the social partners are 
discussing the possibility of lowering labour costs at the 
minimum wage level. Employers have to pay a substantial 
complement to the net wages of their employees because of 
tax duties and the need to pay social premiums. 
The hypothesis behind this government plan is that lower 
wage costs will lead to an increase of labour demand. I am 
confident that this new policy will contribute to a drop in 
the unemployment rates. However, I have some doubts whether 
it will be the ultimate solution to the problem. For it to 
be the ultimate solution the Dutch unemployment problem is 
too complex, even more so if we regard it on a short term 
basis. To give you an example of this complexity, histori- 
cally the Netherlands have had a low participation rate of 
married women in the work force. Currently the rate is at 
about 35 percent, which in itself is the lowest rate in 
Western Europe. However, the percentage of married women in 
the workforce is steadily increasing. This means that the 
growth of the Dutch labour supply will be relatively higher 
than elsewhere in Europe over a range of years. But this is 
only one relevant factor; in addition, the Dutch labour 
market also has to cope with the growing influence of an 
aging population. This as you may know is a tendency which 
also can be noticed on other labour markets in numerous 
other countries. At the same time the Netherlands experien- 
ces, like other western countries, the influence of 
declining birth rates, a development that started in the 
sixties. 
Another relevant factor is the fact that unlike the Nordic 
countries, the Netherlands have not really focussed on the 
development of labour market policies. Much more attention 
was paid to the development of the social security system. 
Only a few years ago the Netherlands had one of the most 
developed social security systems in the world. The system, 
however, has been subject to change. Important in this 
respect is the question why they did not choose for a more 
active labour market policy and to simultaneously work on a 
more modestly composed social security system. I believe 
that part of the explanation deals with the fact that the 
Netherlands have a typically Dutch social and cultural 
structure based on so-called religious and secularized 
pillars. For a number of years the institutions involved 
have coexisted on the fragile basis of national consensus. 
This consensus was inspired primarily by the dominant 
christian ideology on charity and caretaking. There was less 
emphasis on socio-economic consensus between labour and 
capital. 
Summarizing, you can see that the Dutch labour market is a 
relatively complex phenomenon and to battle its unemployment 
is a problem that asks for a diversified policy response. I 
would like to point out to you that the Dutch labour market 
has shifted its attention to the way labour policies are 
applied in the United States. 
Tomorrow Professor Martin Rein of the Massachusetts Insti- 
tute of Technology will give you a more detailed description 
of this recent development. At the request of the Government 
Advisory Council of Social Welfare Policy Dr. Rein has com- 
pared recent developments on the Dutch labour market to 
developments on the labour markets of Sweden and the United 
States. The policy of the latter stands as an outstanding 
example of supply side labour market policies, while the 
former seems to focus more on the so-called Keynesian 
welfare state. I believe he will not mind if I disclose the 
outcome of his study to you: it shows that despite of a 
continuous interest in the Netherlands for the Swedish 
model, the policies are becoming increasingly US-oriented. 
Again the important question is, why does this happen this 
way? 
We will know more on this subject after the presentation of 
Professor Hans Adriaansens, member of the WRR, this after- 
noon. However, not only Dr. Adriaansens will speak on the 
subject of labour markets, Mr. Gerard Keijzers, staff member 
of the WRR, will do the same on Friday morning. Hopefully 
these three introductions will help to give you a better 
impression of the developments on the Dutch labour market in 
comparison with the developments on labour markets in other 
countries. I count on the fact that these presentations will 
at least stimulate you to participate in discussions these 
next few days. 
No matter how important the labour problem is, the scope of 
the conference is not restricted to labour market problems. 
The subject-range of the seminar fortunately is much larger 
than that. In addition to the need of redistribution of 
labour, in the socio-cultural structure of the West European 
countries (the Netherlands in any case) it is important to 
keep as the subject of policies, the redistribution of 
income in order to prevent the fact that too many people 
will drop to the poverty level or below that. I use these 
words eventhough I realize that they may have a relative 
meaning in a global perspective. 
Professor Ad Geelhoed, member of the WRR, will particularly 
focus in his contribution on the changing responsibilities 
and the main consequences thereof for policies of redis- 
tribution of income in the near future. I believe that this 
topic is relevant not only because it has got everything to 
do with the apparent diminishing possibilities in our 
societies for directing highly complex matters, such as 
unemployment, new poverty, and the aging of society, but 
also with another problem which I have not mentioned until 
now, namely the growing pollution of the environment. 
It is my opinion that the extent to which we are able to 
solve the environmental problems will be decisive for human 
well-being in the future. Governments have grossly under- 
estimated this problem until now. I would like to point out 
to you that the Government Advisory Council for Social 
Welfare Policy has recently paid attention to this problem. 
A few months ago the council published a report which showed 
the increasing importance of linking social and environ- 
mental policies. The conclusion of the report was twofold. 
First, the government indeed has to acknowledge this afore 
mentioned connection and second, not only the government but 
particularly the social partners will have to play an 
important role in the development and the promotion of a 
more frugal life style, not only for the people, but also 
for public and private institutions. 
Above and beyond this we need renewed forms of social and 
industrial citizenship, in which not only rights will be 
stressed, but public duties as well. I am confident that 
this is not only a necessity in the Netherlands, but also in 
other member states in the European Community, in the 
OECD-region as well as elsewhere in the world. With this in 
mind I am very happy with the attendence at this seminar of 
two representatives from Eastern Europe. An exchange of 
experiences and views between West and East will certainly 
prove to be successfull. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I am convinced that the seminar will 
be a great success and I am sure it will be a w,orthy suc- 
cessor to all meetings held prior to this one. The HRWB and 
WRR are happy to be your host in the next few days. By the 
way, I am not sure if everyone here knows that this effort 
will mark a unique moment in history for the Dutch present 
at this conference, but for those of you who do not: the 
Dutch government has decided to merge both institutions in 
one powerful, and, I hope, prestigious advisory body for 
government policies in the Netherlands. I hope this does not 
discourage those of you who are accustomed to doing business 
with just one of the organizations. 
In conclusion, I would like to wish you all a good seminar. 
And let me mention that in addition to the formal part of 
the program, there is an informal part which will give you 
ample opportunity to get acquainted with the Dutch culture 
and Dutch hospitality and to give those of you who already 
are familiar to this, a chance to re-acquaint themselves. 
I now would like to ask the chairman of the day, Professor 
Bernard van Praag, member of the WRR, to go ahead with the 
seminar. 
Thank you very much. 
I. INTRODUCTORY PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
1. STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
by Ad Geelhoed, Scientific Council for Government 
Policy, The Netherlands 
The capacities of the national Welfare State to pursue its 
social welfare and social-security policies are gradually 
eroding. Economic, as well as socio-cultural and technolog- 
ical developments, which can hardly be influenced by direct 
state-intervention, are gradually changing the environment 
in which the national Welfare State operates. 
The gradual erosion of the Welfare State's intervention 
capacity is, in my view, attribuable to three distinct major 
causes. 
LOSSES OF INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The capacity of the state and its institutions to act effec- 
tively in the design and administration of the typical 
arrangements of the Welfare State is at present diminishing. 
Social-cultural, economic and technological developments are 
making our society more mobile, more heterogeneous and more 
impredictable. As our society becomes more heterogeneous and 
mobile in cultural as well as social-economic respect, as 
the ideas of individuals on the organization of their per- 
sonal life and on the ultimate goals of the society, grow 
more divergent, the formation of a durable basic-consensus 
on the position and role of government becomes more diffi- 
cult. The national state cannot manifestate itself anymore 
as the pre-eminent expression of a broad consensus on the 
aspirations of the national society. Societal fragmentation, 
in socio-cultural and socio-economic respects, condems the 
state to modesty. We are living in a period of adaptive 
government; the times of aspiring a "Great Society" seem 
long ago. But even where still general consensus on the 
objectives of governmental policy exists, the a-just men- 
tioned developments are making administrative action more 
and more difficult. For instance: our social-security system 
has been built on certain assumptions to the effect that 
behavioural norms and role pattern were reasonable fixed. 
- The family, consisting of a husband, wife and one or more 
children, was considered as the cornerstone of society, and 
marriage was a contract entered into for life. Within the 
marriage the husband was the sole income-earner and married 
woman normally kept to managing the household and caring for 
the children. 
Nowadays none of these basic-assumptions is valid anymore. 
We see a great variation of households and more and more 
married women are presenting themselves on the labour 
market. But the shift to looser family-relations and to an 
other division of paid and unpaid work within the family has 
not been a general one. Large parts of the population are 
adhering to the traditional patterns. 
Obviously the social security-system has to be restructured 
as the basic assumptions on which it was built are not valid 
anymore. But this is not an easy task, while, on the one 
hand, the individual opinions and interests are more at 
variance and, on the other hand, the finding of new solu- 
tions is technically much more difficult because of the 
greater range of various income-situations to be taken into 
account. Any possible solution to this problem will meet 
resistance by parts of the population; consequently the 
administration of the system will become more cumbersome and 
costly. 
It is easy to find numerous comparable examples on practi- 
cally all fields of governmental welfare and economic poli- 
cies, as housing, education, public health and regional 
policies. They all have two aspects in common: the formula- 
tion of generally accepted goals has become more difficult, 
and the execution there-of more onerous. 
Not only the state as such is afflicted by the growing 
mobility and heterogenity of opinions within our society. 
The central organizations of labour and employers have also 
to deal with these developments. The capacity of the 
so-called "social partners" to represent the interests of 
their members is shrinking. The margins they have in nego- 
tiating with the central government are shrinking too. 
Consequently,-the organization of consensus on the general 
directions of governmental policies in the socio-economic 
field has become practically impossible. Without support and 
coverage of the social partners, the Welfare State can have 
only limited ambitions. 
The fragmentation and diversification of the social fabric 
entail, as side-effect, a proliferation of special interest 
groups. In defence of specific interests they address them- 
selves to the State and try to get involved as much as 
possible into the decision-making processes. Preferably they 
seek to ensure institutional and substantive guarantees for 
the interests they represent. This well-studied phenomenon 
leads to a situation in which the Welfare State is tied to a 
still growing number of specific legal arrangements, while 
at the same time a more mobile society demands the State to 
free itself from its institutional sclerosis. This paradox 
is paralysing the Welfare State. 
LOSSES OF EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY 
In its report "The Unfinished European Integration", the WRR 
has already described the losses of external sovereignty due 
to the European economic integration process. These losses 
in capacity to act effectively cannot only be attributed to 
the process of European integration; they are, at least 
partially, caused by the growing interdependencies in the 
economic world system. For the Netherlands the growth rate 
of the world trade is a dominant factor, a primordial condi- 
tion for a sustained growth and a return to full employed. 
Important changes in the Dollar-Deutsch Mark parity are to a 
certain extent a decisive factor in our monetary and fiscal 
policies. Thus, the macro-economic context for the specific 
Welfare State policies is largely determined by forces well 
out of the scope of intervention of the national authorities 
of a relatively small country. How frustrating this may be, 
it is a factor to be reckoned with. More precisely, this 
leaking away of national capacities to intervene on the 
market, can be rubricated as follows: 
a. Very important and radical economic, technological and 
ecological developments are coming about on a supra- 
national scale. These developments are for the smaller 
national societies and States exogeneous data. They may 
be able to react upon these data, but they are certainly 
not able to influence them autonomously. So the national 
policy-agenda is more and more dictated by external 
forces. This process demands, especially from the 
smaller national States, much adaptability in their 
internal institutions and in the contents and instru- 
ments of their various welfare policies. Experience of 
the last twenty years learned that the Dutch society 
could only partially meet this demand. In the national 
Welfare State the actors involved in the national deci- 
sion-making processes tend to be inward-looking; nor- 
mally they do not sufficiently and timely take into 
account changes in the external context. This explains, 
at least partially, why the autonomous national economic 
policy-measures of the recent past were so ineffective. 
b. Public interventions to influence developments at a 
supra-national level make in the long run only sense if 
they are co-ordinated at that level or if the powers to 
take the necessary measures are attributed to inter- 
national or supra-national organizations (or institu- 
tions). 
But the growing intensity of international economic 
interdepencies also affects the national capacities to 
act with respect to problems which, in theory, can be 
solved in a national context. 
National measures to correct imperfections in the func- 
tioning of the market or to protect interests that might 
suffer in a situation of unfethered competition - such 
as statutory requirements in the interests of public 
health or energy conservation - in principle apply 
equally to all actors in the national market. But when 
in a more or less finished common market, Member States 
begin to introduce such measures, it is likely that 
those will vary in terms of content and costs. As a 
result, both the protection of the interests involved 
and the ensuiing commitments may also diverge. In these 
circumstances a common market makes it much simpler for 
the parties in the market to evade the statutory 
requirements of a particular state by transferring their 
activities elsewhere within the community. Bluntly said: 
a national society aspiring a relatively high level of 
social security or environmental protection may be 
punished by a high level of unemployment. In order to 
prevent "a race to the bottomw, minimum levels and 
standards need to be determined at community level. 
Market integration requires policy-integration: the use 
of national powers becomes subject to the use of commu- 
nity powers. 
c. Co-ordination of national policies and the attribution 
of national competences to supra-national institutions 
entail for national policy-makers legal obligations and 
restrictions in fields where they possessed hitherto 
wide discretionnary powers. The current practice of the 
European integration process learns that national 
governments and Parliaments are ill-at-ease with the 
ever shrinking margins for their national policy-prefer- 
ences. As a result they are sometimes confronted with 
unexpected set backs, resulting from EC-Court decisions. 
Inevitably the national law-making process becomes more 
and more a judicial exercise. In this way the national 
legislative bodies directly meet the losses of their 
external sovereignty. 
THE EROSION OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-CULTURAL BASES 
OF THE WELFARE STATE 
The socio-economic and socio-cultural fundaments on which, 
after the Second World War, the Welfare State has been 
constructed are gradually crumbling away. The expansion of 
the industrial sector does not entail an expansion in' 
employment anymore. Industrial policies and employment 
policies are becoming less and less congruent. National 
governments have lost the capabilities of pursuing autono- 
mously short term macro-economic policy goals. Most of the 
classical Keynesian macro-economic policy-instruments have 
become, wholly or partially, obsolete in the present con- 
text. A de facto free movement of capital within the common 
market has made unilateral national monetary interventions 
ineffective or even counter productive. 
Unilateral fiscal and budgetary interventions to boost 
aggregate demand are extremely hazardous, because a too 
ambitious national government may incur, as the French 
experience in the beginning of the Eighties shows, a growing 
budget deficit and a trade deficit as well. Public price 
controls meet the very strict legal limitations of the 
EC-Treaty and wages- and income-controls can hardly be made 
operative without the (lacking) consent of the social part- 
ners. But even if aggregate demand management would still be 
possible, would full employment be the result? I have my 
doubts. The larger part of the present unemployment must be 
ascribed to structural causes that cannot be remedied by 
macro-economic demand policies. 
Most of the present social security-arrangements were con- 
structed under the presumption that full employment could be 
assured by governmental macro-economic interventions. As 
that presumption proved to be invalid, the social security 
systems of the Welfare State are facing overburdening out- 
lays in benefits and diminishing returns in payments. At 
first governments tried to meet both, by a reduction of the 
individual entitlements as well as by a rise of the compul- 
sory contributions. But here, too, the policy margins are 
narrow. On the one hand the recipients of social security 
benefits may not be pushed below a socially acceptable 
poverty line, on the other hand high transfer payments have 
an adverse effect on labour costs and, hence, on employment. 
Comparable problems of shrinking receipts and expanding 
expenditures have shown up in litteraly all fields of 
positive public intervention, as housing, education, public 
health provisions, etc. All the entitlements the Welfare 
State promised to the lesser-well-off have proven to be 
extremely weak. In its promises that State turned out to be 
- untrustworthy. The most fundamental question the national 
welfare State now faces is a credibility-deficit with those 
population groups that depend on its provisions. 
STRUCTURAL SOLUTIONS? 
When seeking solutions for the present problems of the - 
Welfare State, nostalgia to the haydays of that State in the 
late Sixties and early Seventies would offer bad advise. But 
the same observation is applicable to those who want to go 
even further back, to "les beaux temps d'antan" of the 
"caring society" with a particular corporatist flavour. The 
traditional social unities, as the extended family, parish, 
guild or local community, proved to be even more vulnerable 
for the same developments that have eroded the foundations 
of the Welfare State. Moreover, the Welfare State came into 
being just when and just because the traditional unities 
failed to meet the requirements of an industrializing 
society. How then could we expect those unities to be able 
to meet the demands of a post-industrial society? Others are 
advocating the transformation of the Welfare State into a 
"safeguarding" state, in which most of the public provisions 
could be abandoned to the much more efficient market. A 
market which would, no doubt, also prove its efficiency in 
the allocation of well-being and happiness for all those 
individuals which act according to utilitarian prescrip- 
tions. This solution, with the flavour of a peculiar 
Thatcherite bias, leaves one fundamental question open to 
answer: which safeguards, to what extent and to whom? 
In my analysis the prevailing political doctrines do not 
offer'viable solutions to the fundamental problems our 
Welfare State and our society is presently meeting. First of 
all because all the solutions offered as self-evident, do 
not take into account the reasons for the Welfare State and 
the causes of its present jeopardy. 
The basic "raison d8Qtre" of the Welfare State is the demand 
for safeguarding on a decent level of existence for all 
those, who temporarily or definitly cannot meet the require- 
ments in skill and education of our post-industrial society. 
No doubt such a society will entail higher claims and risks 
to its members. Could we expect that they are willing to 
meet them, when a decent level of subsistence is no longer 
safeguarded? 
In my opinion the Welfare State in Western Europe faces 
important strategic choices: 
Restoration of the conditions for an effective 
macro-economic policy-management. Does this require at 
European Community level a adequate institutional frame- 
work for the co-ordination of national macro-economic 
and monetary policy goals as well as interventions? 
Convergence or divergence in the structure and level of 
social security benefits and provisions? Is a gradual 
and differentiated approximation really needed? Can 
Member States of which the economies have become heavily 
interdependent afford substantial disparities in their 
social security-systems? 
To what extent will it be possible to combine security 
and material equality in the administration of social 
security? Does a dynamic and pluralist society demand 
flexible and differentiated social security systems or 
must we go back (or forward) to systems to be based on 
individual rights and obligations, irrespective of an 
individual's family situation? 
If labour market mobility is necessary to contain the 
number of permanent unemployed, must unemployment bene- 
fits be made conditional to the benefitors' willingness 
to improve their skills and education? In short: how 
hard is the case for the "hard" Welfare State? 
Plenary discussion in connection with "Structural chanuesw 
by Ad Geelhoed 
(chairman Bernard van Praag, rapporteur Willem Dercksen) 
Michel Gaspard (France) started the discussion by commenting 
on each of the causes of the gradual erosion of the Welfare 
State's intervention capacity mentioned by Geelhoed. In 
Geelhoed's view the losses of internal sovereignty - the 
diminishing capacity of the state to act actively and effec- 
tively - are caused by the impredictability of the effects 
of developments such as growing social heterogeneity and 
social fragmentation. At present it is difficult for govern- 
ments to base its policies on social consensus. However, 
Gaspard stated, societies have always consisted of different 
social groups with different interests. Possibly individual- 
ization is a new phenomenon, but social fragmentation is 
not. In the 1950s and 1960s government policies could be 
based on social consensus, even though there was a certain 
degree of social fragmentation in these periods. This 
implies that, at least in theory, it must be possible to 
find a new social consensus. The actual problems for govern- 
ments are - at least partly - related to financial problems. 
Compared to the 1950s and 1960s, the present lack of eco- 
nomic growth frustrates the possibilities for active and 
effective policies. In the 1980s the reduced financial means 
for state intervention caused a growing competition between 
interest groups. Consequently, Welfare States suffer from a 
declining legitimacy. 
In Geelhoed's view the losses of external sovereignty are 
caused by the European economic integration process and the 
increasing interdependencies in the world economic system. 
Nations are now less autonomous than in the past and tradi- 
tional economic policies do not work anymore. According to 
Gaspard this analysis is too simple. For instance, at this 
time Germany has large margins for Keynesian macro-economic 
policy. Japan has these margins as well. The USA showed in 
1983/84 a partial success in pursuing Keynesian policies. 
The results were high economic growth and high deficits. 
These examples neither prove or disapprove the bankruptcy of 
national Keynesian policies; however they do complicate 
Geelhoed's analysis of losses of external sovereignty. 
Possibly, the EC can successfully apply traditional 
macro-economic policies in the future. This certainly 
implies a loss of sovereignty for the nations involved. A 
second argument against Geelhoed's analysis is that not all 
field of society are equally influenced by international 
economic interdependencies. These fields offer chances for 
active and effective state intervention. For instance the 
services sector is not as internationalized as agriculture 
or manufacturing. Services in many cases are organized on a 
regional or local basis. Probably they offer a fruitfull 
field for effective national employment policies. 
In Geelhoed's analysis the gradual erosion of the Welfare 
State's capacity to intervene is further caused by the 
crumbling away of its socio-economic and socio-cultural 
fundaments. Aggregate demand management became impossible 
and the social security systems, educational systems and 
public health systems meet shrinking receipts and increasing 
expenditures. Gaspard thinks that "inversionn is a better 
phrase for this process, than "erosion". In the future, 
economic growth might provide a basis for an other inversion 
of the present logic. The services sector may become the new 
source of economic growth. 
Michel Gaspard draws three conclusions from his comments: 
1. it is necessary to enlarge the financial margins for 
state interventions. States have to find new sources of 
power and finance in renewed economic growth. This will 
provide the necessary means for the maintenance of 
internal and external sovereignty; 
2. social policies must be adjusted to meet the present 
situation; for instance, to provide for child care. 
There is a need for new institutional frames. In the 
future, the state will probably provide less services 
itself, but might work together more intensively with 
other partners (communities, regions, social partners) 
in order to provide services; 
3. the state can find new fields of intervention in the 
services sector; here states will be less sovereign and 
more partners. 
Gerard Keiizerq (The Netherlands) puts foreward that losses 
of internal sovereignty are not a new phenomenon. In history 
there are more examples of interest groups causing losses of 
internal state-sovereignty. 
Ad Geelhoed (The Netherlands) answers that the Welfare State 
is not suited for all economic seasons. Economic growth is a 
necessary condition; if there is no growth the Welfare State 
will disappear. At present national states are not able to 
manage economic growth. However, this possibility does exist 
on EC-level. Because of this, he argues that the process of 
market integration must be complemented by integration of 
policies. Unfortunately, there is no consensus between coun- 
tries on major socio-economic objectives. This consensus 
needs to be developed. As a new source of economic growth, a 
transformation of social security benefits to social ser- 
vices might be an objective to agree upon. 
Bernard van Praaq (The Netherlands) asks Geelhoed for 
further explanation. Does he intend to expand the collective 
sector or is the intention to create a system of workfare. 
Geelhoed (The Netherlands) answers that there exists a need 
for a lot of services. However, the finance of these ser- 
vices is the problem. A transformation of social security 
benefits to the finance of these services might generate 
employment in these services fields. 
Peter Brannen (United Kingdom) has some additional comments. 
In his view economic growth is necessary for the future 
maintenance of the welfare state. But also the existence of 
the welfare state itself is a necessary precondition for 
economic growth. In addition, the welfare state is still 
alive as an important component of the economic system. The 
EC have the potential for sovereignty on a community level. 
This sovereignty can be used to fight long term unemploy- 
ment, as one of the largest problems of a lot of European 
countries. 
- Bernard van Praaq (The Netherlands) puts foreward that 
social security is a luxury good. There is a relation with 
the other forms of economic production. Probably there is an 
optimum level of social security, depending on the wealth of 
a nation. In a lot of countries a reduction in the level of 
social security might generate economic growth. 
Martin Rein (United States) criticizes this hypothesis, 
because there is no empirical evidence for it. 
Erik de Gier (The Netherlands) suggests that because of 
socio-cultural developments a new principle for redistrib- 
ution is needed. A principle of individual redistribution 
also requires a new principle of social justice. 
Ad Geelhoed (The Netherlands) states that social justice in 
terms of equality is connected with the Welfare State. 
Processes as individualization and social fragmentation, 
however, cause variations in income levels. Thus, the family 
as the standard for measuring differences in income becomes 
improper. At present there is no justifiable standard for 
measuring differences in income. 
Michel Gaspard (France) wonders if more social injustice 
cannot be a source of economic growth. For instance the USA 
have economic growth, as well as a growing inequality in 
income distribution. 
Ola Ribe (Norway) wonders why Holland has not incorporated 
employment chances in economic planning. Why has there been 
no transformation of unemployment through the provision of 
social services as in Norway or Sweden. 
Ad Geelhoed (The Netherlands) answers that there are two 
reasons: 1. institutional reasons; there is a fear of sub- 
stitution by organized workers. The existing social security 
system appeared to be a blockade to this kind of strategy 
for fighting unemployment; 2. actors in the public sector 
have lost confidence in finding effective solutions for the 
unemployment problem. 
Karel van den Bosch (Belgium) remarks that in Holland social 
security expenditure is rather stable now; forecasts on this 
subject do not forsee major problems either. 
Martin Rein (United States) adds that also in OECD-prognoses 
there is scope for growth in the Welfare State. 
Peter Bod (Hungary) wonders if the Welfare State really is a 
luxury good. Possibly the Welfare State prevents a lot of 
social problems, for instance crime. In other words, social 
services pacify and are an alternative for repressive ser- 
vices (police) . 
Bernard van Praaq (The Netherlands) concludes that there is 
a relation between economic growth and social security/so- 
cia1 services and vice versa. Theoretically, there must be 
some economic optimum for the extent of the Welfare State. 
In practice, however, it is difficult to indicate this 
optimum. In any case the sky will not be the limit for the 
Welfare State. 
2. CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 
NETHERLANDS* 
by Hans Adriaansens, Scientific Council for 
Government Policy, The Netherlands 
"Holland is an extraordinary country". When Mr. Van Eekelen, 
our former Secretary of Defence, was forced to resign, he 
spoke these memorable words in his farewell-address to our 
House of Commons, and he did put a lot of drama in them. 
Understandably so, for, unlike Mr. Profumo some decades ago, 
he wasn't accused of fooling around with call-girls; Mr. Van 
Eekelen is indeed a very honourable man. And unlike 
Mr. Carrington some years ago, he couldn't be held respon- 
sible for having overlooked a war threat either. No, Mr. Van 
Eekelen had to leave office because his successor at another 
government-post was accused of having misled the Parliament 
with respect to the production of a new Dutch passport. No 
moral scandal, no war, but just a simple passport: for 
foreigners, it must be difficult and hilarious at the same 
time to grasp the deeper codes of our political culture. 
However, not only with respect to political culture does 
Holland have its idiosyncracies; in socio-economic respect, 
too, Holland is an extraordinary country. Let me give you a 
few examples. A few number to begin with: 
a. Only 50% of the population between ages 15 and 65 
participates in any official economic activity which 
belongs to what is called the "formal" sector. This 
percentage is as low as that of Ireland and the Mediter- 
ranean countries, considerably lower than that of 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, West-Germany and France, 
and it shows, on top of that, a slightly downward ten- 
dency. Compared to activity rates in countries with 
which Holland and the European Community are supposed to 
compete, the situation is even worse: in Japan, whose 
* Transcript of a lecture held on November 2, 1988. 
economic system is admittedly not entirely comparable to 
ours, socio-economic participation rates hover around 
70%. In the United States that same level of 70% is 
reached and the tendency there is decisively upward. In 
Sweden over 80% of socio-economic participation is 
realized, and even that already very high number has a 
slight tendency to grow. 
So, of a grand total of almost 15 million people living 
in Holland, approximately 10 million belong to the age 
groups between 15 and 65. Only 5 million of them are 
economically active. The other 5 million are (next to 
the people who are under 15 and over 65) economic depen- 
dent either upon state provisions (like the unemployed, 
the sick and the disabled, a little over 2 million) or 
upon family-maintenance (another 2% million people, 
mostly women who are not officially registered as unem- 
ployed and children between 15 and 18), or on a combina- 
tion of both dependencies (students!). I think we may 
conclude that the formal sector in Holland is indeed 
remarkably small. 
There is a second series of interesting facts. No other 
country in the western world has an extensive "informal" 
economic sector comparable to Holland. This, very often 
illegal, side of Dutch economy, in which no taxes or 
premiums are paid by either the informal employer or the 
informal employee, has grown very rapidly. Recent 
studies (by OSA, the organization of strategic labour 
market research) have shown that about 55% of Dutch 
households regularly call upon informal paid labour to 
perform services. No less than 40% of people between 
age 17 and 65 form the supply-side of this informal 
labour market. It is estimated that, depending on how 
many shades of grey are included in the definition of 
this "black sector", the equivalent of some'400.000 
full-time jobs is involved, being almost 10% of total 
Dutch employment. 
c. But there is more. Perhaps Holland is to a lesser extent 
a "nation of joiners" than Alexis de Tocqueville said 
America was, but it most certainly has a very exten- 
sively developed voluntary sector. Over 5 million people 
(a higher number than that of the formal labour sector) 
are on an regular and organized basis committed to 
voluntary work. It has been recently estimated that 
these activities represent the equivalent of 8% of the 
Dutch GNP and of 800.000 full-time jobs. 
And finally, not unlike Sweden and the United States, 
Holland shows rather positive signs of economic develop- 
ment; of course, the rise of the per capita Gross 
Domestic Product hasn't been that impressive as it used 
to be in the sixties and early seventies, but there 
still has been a rise and compared to the early eighties 
there is strong evidence of economic recovery. The same 
is true for the wages, real wages, that is, for the 
people who are employed. 
So, what do we have: on the one hand decreasing numbers of 
people participating in the formal labour sector, on the 
other hand increasing numbers of people working in the 
informal en/or black sector and the voluntary sector. In 
relation to these numbers (400,000 jobs in the informal 
sector and 800,000 jobs in the voluntary sector) it is at 
least interesting and paradoxical at the same time, to note 
that official unemployment in The Netherlands is at the 
level of about 700,000 people. 
Let me end this introductory section with two preliminary 
conclusions: first it seems that very high levels of 
(formal) unemployment go very well together with compara- 
tively "normal" levels of economic growth. Dutch performance 
on the score of economic growth is certainly at the same 
level as that of the United States or Sweden, and maybe even 
better than that of many EC-countries. This preliminary 
conclusion contains, of course, nothing new: we simply have 
to face the fact that high unemployment and a steady level 
of economic growth go very well together. But we also have 
to face the fact that it doesn't need to be that way. There 
is a difference between countries, like Sweden and the USA, 
who have apparently spent the bulk of the realized economic 
growth to employment, while others, like Holland show a 
relatively rapid growth of real wages and at the same time a 
steep rise in unemployment. It was Freeman who, among many 
others, called our attention to this trade-off between real 
wages and employment, as he said: 
"All the calculations show that, holding fixed the 
growth of output, economies, where real wages grew 
relatively rapidly'had relatively slow growth in employ- 
ment and conversely. The United States and Sweden, for 
example, did not have markedly higher growth of real GDP 
than other countries, but did have markedly lower 
growths of real wages and correspondingly higher growths 
.of employment. Because rates of growth of GDP vary less 
than rates of growth of real wages, the bulk of the 
story about differences in performance is told by the 
real wage employment trade-off." 
As Martin Rein, who will give his contribution tomorrow, 
will certainly deal with this part of the question, I can go 
on to my second preliminary conclusion: comparing Dutch 
performance on the score of employment with the United 
States and Sweden, but also with various countries of the 
European Community, it seems probable that on the general 
level of socio-economic policy some typically Dutch idio- 
syncracies play a hidden but important part in causing 
unemployment. 
It is with respect to this second conclusion (of the Dutch 
idiosyncracies in socio-economic policy) that I would like 
to say a few words. It may be good to tell you my own 
conclusion in advance. I will call for serious and strong 
policies with respect to employment. Frankly, I would hate 
the idea of Holland inventing yet another form of "apart- 
heid": not civil and political apartheid this time, like in 
South Africa, but a new kind of socio-economic apartheid on 
an institutionalized basis, in which some people officially 
work and others are officially forced to refrain from work: 
full citizenship for some and only half citizenship for 
others. I would maintain that in view of this threat we need 
to rethink not only our specific labour market policies, but 
also the main tenets of our social economic policies in 
general. In this contribution I would like to do two things. 
I will try to explain why socio-economic participation in 
Holland is at such a low level and secondly why it is that 
this rethinking,of the main tenets of our socio-economic 
policies is of the utmost importance. In order to do so 
properly, I need to insert a short intermezzo with respect 
to the concept of citizenship. 
In 1949 T.H. Marshall, the English historian and sociolo- 
gist, made a distinction between three dimensions of 
citizenship (cf. T.H. Marshall, "Class, citizenship and 
development" and B.S. Turner, "On the concept of citizen- 
ship"). In the 18th century, he argued, there has been a 
significant development of civil rights targetted at the 
legal status of individuals; a system of formal law courts 
was devised as an institutional defence of these rights. 
These civil rights were concerned with such basic issues as 
the freedom of speech, rights to a fair trial and equal 
access to the legal system. Secondly, with respect to the 
19th century, Marshall noted an important growth in polit- 
ical rights. That, of course, was the result of the 
working-class struggle for political equality and greater 
access to the parliamentary process. Political citizenship 
involved the development of electoral rights and wider 
access to political institutions, such as political parties, 
secret voting etc. Finally, with respect to the 20th cen- 
tury, Marshall drew attention to the expansion of social 
rights. They were the basis of claims to welfare and guaran- 
teed.the citizen's access to social security in periods of 
unemployment, sickness and distress (cf. Turner). Thus, 
corresponding to the three domains of citizenship rights 
(the civil, the political and the social), we find three 
types of central institutions of contemporary society (the 
law courts, Parliament and the welfare system), which all 
three function as a kind of safeguard, as a guarantee, with 
respect to the various citizenship rights. 
Thus far, I find this analysis of Marshall rather attrac- 
tive. However, there is one addition I would like to make 
with respect to his analysis. That concerns the aspect of 
active participation. The rights which were developed in the 
last three centuries were not only backed by formal institu- 
tions which protected people from the abuse of power. Of 
course, those institutions, like the law court system, the 
parliamentary system and the welfare system, were of eminent 
importance, but for citizens to participate in a democratic 
society much more is needed. So civil rights like the free- 
dom of speech became complemented by a system of education. 
For people to participate in the public debate they need to 
be educated to the point that they are able to adequately 
form their own ideas and have their own well-informed stand- 
points. So the educational system came about as the active 
or the participation aspect of this first dimension of 
citizenship. The same is true for the second dimension of 
citizenship, which, according to Marshall, developed during 
the 19th century. While the parliamentary system developed 
as a formal guarantee to the citizen's political rights, 
political parties and caucuses organized the active politi- 
cal participation of citizens. They so added a more active, 
participation side to the institutionalization of this 
political dimension of citizenship. 
I want to concentrate, of course, on the social or 
socio-economic dimension of citizenship. The balance of 
passive and active institutionalization on this dimension 
forms, as I see it, the very heart of the discussion about 
the modern welfare state. It is the discussion between 
"strong" and "soft" welfare states, between active and 
caring welfare states. It is considered an elementary part 
of citizenship that people get the opportunity to take part 
in the socio-economic process, in very much the same way as 
we now think it normal for citizens to enact there civil and 
political rights by way of participation in educational and 
political structures (although, in Holland more than in the 
United States and Japan for example, enrollment in educa- 
tional systems and participation in political parties is 
also at a rather low level). 
It is exactly here that the development of the Welfare State 
has taken different courses in various countries. In some 
countries more than in others, passive forms of institu- 
tionalization of citizenship rights have superseded the more 
active forms. That is certainly the case for Holland, as the 
Dutch Welfare State developed into a caring society in which 
some people care and others are taken care of. This is not 
to suggest that someone, some group or political ideology, 
is to blame for this situation. The question is, rather, 
which historical determinants plaid a part in this passive 
institutionalization of the Dutch welfare system. The answer 
to this question may give us also the solution to my main 
question, namely, why it is, that socio-economic activity 
rates in Holland are so remarkably low compared to other 
countries in the modern western world. 
There is another way to put the very same question. As 
various authors have claimed (Therborn, Schmidt, Rein), the 
level of unemployment in modern western countries is sig- 
nificantly influenced by the extent to which the ideology of 
full employment has been institutionalized at the level of 
concrete labour market policies. In some countries, not in 
all, social policies and labour market policies have had, 
almost right from the start of the welfare system, virtually 
no relation to each other. The effect of that has been, that 
social policies were being seen as contradictory to work, 
contradictory to the labour market. The reception of the 
recent WRR-report "An Active Labour Market Policy", in which 
many active manpower policies were being recommended, by the 
cabinet as well as the two sides of industry, shows how 
difficult it is in Holland to develop labour market policies 
on their own account, that is, independent of any immediate 
technical-economic goal. It thus seems that the full employ- 
ment ideology hasn't found a much "active" institutional 
backing in The Netherlands alongside the rather "passive" 
but extensive system of unemployment benefits and other 
welfare benefits. 
The question is, then, how this relatively unfavorable or 
even indifferent attitude with respect to full employment as 
a value in itself has come about. Hasn't there been a time, 
particularly in Holland, that work was seen as a holy duty? 
Dit not Max Weber's notion of a mostly religiously inspired 
"work ethic" particularly fit the Dutch situation? Yes, it 
did, certainly. But it has become clear by now, that adher- 
ence to that workethic and to the value of full employment 
- has always been more a result of a religiously inspired duty 
than an autonomous drive to take actively part in the 
development of oneself and society. The consequence of that 
has been, that when religious inspiration gradually faded 
away, labour was seen as mere duty and all hopes went in the 
direction of a leisure society instead of an active society. 
Although it may seem improbable, I would suggest that both 
the speed with which the Dutch welfare system during the 
sixties, after a very slow start, came into existence, as 
well as the eagerness with which existing welfare provisions 
since the late seventies have come under attack, stem from 
the very same source: the tendency for Dutch people to see 
themselves as parts of a system of hierarchical, pillarized, 
top-down, or "passive" care and duty. Because of this super- 
sedure of the active side of socio-economic citizenship by 
its passive side, and because of the gradual secularization 
of the religious underpinning of the traditional workethic, 
citizenship has grown into some sort of "clientship", in the 
same way as citizens have become clients of an all encom- 
passing care system: objects of care instead of autonomous 
citizens. And just like clients, they are entitled to com- 
plain every now and then. 
Why do I put so much emphasis on labour? Why do I not agree 
to the rather fashionable idea of leisure becoming the 
future's main allocative axis, the main source of future 
society? I do have a couple of reasons, two of which stem 
from social scientific thought. First of all, I am very much 
impressed by the literature which relates to questions of 
institutional or social integration. Like Durkheim, one of 
the founding fathers of academic sociology, I think that it 
is important for a society to have a minimum level of 
institutional integration. Changes in our modern western 
society have resulted in what has been called "the erosion 
of intermediary structures", that is, the erosion of tradi- 
tional structures which, in combination with each other, 
were able to give identity to people. The family, the 
church, the school, the city as well as all kinds of organi- 
zations and, as they were called by America's Founding 
Fathers, the "lesser societies", they were all organized 
around this religiously inspired notion of work ethic and 
together they defined the individual's self-esteem and 
formed the basis of societal integration. These intermediary 
structures managed to relate individuals to the great 
bureaucracies, granting them a place and an identity in 
society. Having a social identity is important for a person, 
"for we should not forget that democracy has its very foun- 
dation and raison d'etre in a participating, active, politi- 
cally conscious demos, whose proper Sitz im Leben ought to 
be the social realm between the public state and the private 
individual" (cf. Zijderveld, in "The Demise of Democracy"). 
This intermediary field has become under a lot of pressure 
and it has gradually lost much of its identity-granting 
power. I am pretty sure that the intermediary field which 
will come instead (and there certainly will develop such an 
intermediary field), will most probably not be a restoration 
of the old and traditional "societal community" - that is, a 
sort of corporatist, in the Dutch case also pillarized, 
society. 
Traditional intermediary institutions, such as the family, 
the neighborhood, the city, the church, the voluntary asso- 
ciations, may certainly regain or keep some relevance, but 
for the central task of achieving a certain degree of insti- 
tutional integration they are no longer equipped. What about 
"new social movements", like the peace movement, the 
feminist movement, will they be able to handle this task? To 
a certain extent, they certainly will, but not entirely and 
' only for a rather limited period of time, until the issue 
for which the movement has come into existence has lost its 
appeal, as Zijderveld once wrote (cf. ibidem). What then, is 
there some other mechanism which may function as an inte- 
grating device for society? There may be many, but they all 
need some axis around which they can be organized in order 
to gain in identity-granting and integrative power. Person- 
ally I think, that labour constitutes such a mechanism, such 
an axis. This time, however, not as a religiously inspired 
duty, but as a chance for personal and societal growth and 
development. Let us be mindful of the fact that labour, 
particularly the labour of post-industrial society, is not 
inimical to personal and societal development, but rather a 
necessary condition. Therefore, we better take labour, 
labour market policies, and social policies in general even 
more serious than we have done thus far. They form part and 
parcel of a democratic society. 
I just said that there were two reasons for me to put so 
much emphasis on a rethinking of labour and the role labour 
can play in forming a democratic society. The second reason 
has to do with chances and problems for policies in general 
(this, in fact, gives me the chance to elaborate on some 
notions Mr. Geelhoed has discussed this morning, particu- 
larly his idea of the loss of internal sovereignty). It has 
gradually come to the fore, that for policies to be effec- 
tive (whether it be governmental policies with respect to 
ethnic minorities, the enforcement of law or policies 
directed toward specific groups like the young and the 
elderly), they should be embedded in a stream of basic and 
unproblematic societal process, that is, a minimum level of 
institutional integration. I would like to launch the 
suggestion that in a situation, like in Holland, where only 
50% of the people between 15 and 65 take part in the 
socio-economic process, this minimum level is not reached, 
and that therefore the effectiveness of many governmental 
policies leaves much to be desired. That is certainly true 
for .the sectors I just mentioned. Full employment, where 
employment is defined or redefined in an active way and not 
just seen as penance for the Fall of Man, may then consti- 
tute a precondition for effective governmental policy. 
Recently some positive signs can be discovered in Dutch 
socio-economic policy. Very important in that respect has 
been that people gradually shifted their attention from the 
official unemployment ratio (which in fact is based on a 
very narrow definition of unemployment) to the broadest 
definition possible: non-participation. The remarkable 
difference between 13% unemployment and about 50% non-par- 
ticipation in the productive sector has made organizations, 
political parties as well as employer's organizations and 
trade unions more inclined to change toward active forms of 
labour market policy. Considering the longstanding Dutch 
inertia with respect to active institutionalization of the 
.full employment ideology, this may be an indication of a new 
era coming up, in which citizenship will get its active 
socio-economic dimension and the welfare state becomes a 
true participation democracy. 
A couple of days ago I received this new HRWB-report written 
by Rein and Freeman, The Dutch Choice. I read it with great 
interest and I particularly liked their plea for a social 
policy complementary to work. In fact, in this contribution 
I also tried to relate social and economic aspects of 
citizenship and welfare state. I therefore may be allowed to 
end this contribution by quoting Rein's and Freeman's con- 
clusion: 
"...we hope that he or she will accept the main message: 
there is nothing intrinsic about social policy that 
makes it inimical to work. Some policies are inimical. 
Others are not. The task is to devise policies that are 
complementary to work." 
These words are as true as the words I started this contri- 
bution with: Holland is an extraordinary country. 
- Plenarv discussion in connection with "Citizenship and 
socio-economic ~olicv in the Netherlandsw bv Hans Adriaansens 
(chairman Bernard van Praag, rapporteur Rieneke Meij) 
S~PDO Moissio (Finland) in his reaction refers to the con- 
cept of the active society, as was recently put forward by 
the OECD. This concept deals with the relations between the 
economic, social, labour market-and educational policies. 
The OECD considers the question whether full employment is a 
prerequisite for an active society. Additionally, he draws 
some comparisons between Holland and Finland. The figures 
relating to the participation rate of Dutch women are sur- 
prisingly low, when compared to Finnish figures. In Finland, 
recently a new, individualized tax system has been intro- 
duced. Social premiums have been reformed too. 
Peter Brannen (United Kingdom) discusses the various models 
pertaining to labour market policy. First of all the posi- 
tive model (Sweden); secondly, the welfare model (the unem- 
ployed are passive); thirdly, the market model; and finally, 
the liberal model (United Kingdom). The liberal model refers 
to a restructuring of welfare in combination with industrial 
relations. Modifying the Welfare State means in the liberal 
model less universality and more targetting. More targetting 
means for instance, setting up programs on education, 
especially in technical areas, and a move to a positive 
labour market policy on the Swedish line by picking up the 
unemployed into training. In the UK liberal model the 
responsibility of employers for employment is explicitly 
stated. The model stresses the active relations between 
macro-economic, labour market and social policies. The 
concept of citizenship changes in this model from collective 
income rights to rights on training. 
According to Martin Rein (US) the debate in the United 
Kingdom and the USA does not focus on citizenship, on 
entitlement, but on responsibility, on the obligation to 
work and to educate. 
Bernard van Praaq (The Netherlands) points out that there 
are two types of training: training of the still employed 
persons.and training of the unemployed (meagre prospects, if 
any, on the labour market). He would like to learn about the 
experiences in different countries regarding these two types 
of training. 
In reaction Peter Brannen (United Kingdom) emphasizes the 
demographic factor. Because of the steadily declining 
numbers of young.people on the labour market (in 1995 25% 
less in the UK) and because of the increasing numbers of 
early retiring people, employers have a stake in the educa- 
tion and training of women. 
Simon Miles (Canada) points out that there is an imbalance 
between the lack of commitment to specific jobs on the part 
of the workers and the high costs of training. Retraining 
however, is needed on a much larger scale as is provided at 
present. 
Costas Kannello~oulos (Greece) wants to know more about the 
difference between the informal and the black sectors in the 
Netherlands. He emphasizes the economic effects of a huge 
"black" economy, like in the Netherlands, where 1/3 of the 
national product remains untaxed. On the other hand, people 
in poverty are served by the informal sector. 
In his reply Hans Adriaansens points out that the level of 
labour costs determines to a large extent the volume of the 
informal sector. Because of the high costs of labour, 
regular activities have been thrown out of the formal labour 
market. 
According to Michel Gas~ard (France) there is a definite 
relationship between the participation of women in the 
labour force and the development of the service economy. If 
the service employment in the public and private sector 
thrives, the participation of women increases. On the other 
hand, if the participation of women increases without a 
concomittant development of the service economy, unemploy- 
ment will be growing. 
Hans ad ria an sen^ explains that the low participation of 
Dutch women is caused by the religiously inspired "bread- 
winners" model. This model is at the basis of all institu- 
tional arrangements in the Dutch socio-economic sphere. 
Erik de Gier (The Netherlands) would like to hear more about 
other integrating forces in society next to labour. He fears 
that pressing people to participate in the labour force, as 
in Sweden, could be considered as an intrusion into the 
private lifes of citizens. Would it not be wiser to follow 
the Italian model instead of the Swedish one? In Italy the 
black economy is prospering and everybody seems to accept 
that. 
Hans Adriaansens points out that in his view labour meets 
the need for societal integration best, now that the inter- 
mediary organizations are losing importance and new social 
movements do not as yet replace the remarking integrating 
powers. The focus on labour as an important integrating 
force recognizes the importance of the quality of labour and 
of labour conditions. 
Simon Miles (Canada) fully agrees with this last viewpoint. 
Work activities do have relevance for human development. 
Environmental issues are of utmost importance as well. 
Future generations will have to pay the debts we are making 
now. It seems to be necessary to reconsider the role of the 
state, of the decision making process, in the light of these 
problems. Production methods have to be changed. Citizens 
have to reconsider their responsibilities in these fields. 
Erik de Gier points out that social policy will have to be 
broadened to include besides the issue of distribution of 
incomes, the questions regarding environment as well. 
Michal Malawski (Poland) brings to the fore that the 
solution of environmental problems will be complicated by 
the international dimension of these problems. 
3. LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
by Martin Rein, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, United States 
(Summary of Martin Rein's introduction and the 
plenary discussion in connection with this presen- 
tation, chaired by Peter Brannen, reported by 
Gerard Keijzers) 
In his introduction Martin Rein (United States) dwells on 
three.- interrelated - subjects: 
I Social policy as an instrument of labour market policy. 
I1 Industrial relations and the manpower system as the two 
other iqtitutions in the sphere of labour market policy. 
I11 What can Holland learn from the different labour market 
policies of respectively the USA and Sweden? 
I Martin Rein argues that because of the existence of a 
trade off between work and leisure, there is an equally 
strong relation between paid labour and the social 
security system. In this sense one must speak of social 
policy as an institution that influences the functioning 
of the labour market. Martin Rein illustrates this 
relationship with three examples: 
a. Through its transfers but also through its provi- 
sion of public services, the system of social 
security and social policy generates employment. 
Martin Rein states that this is a very important 
"by-product" of the existing social welfare system. 
He argues that future growth of employment will be 
generated predominantly in the social services 
sector and that therefore social policy becomes an 
important instrument of employment policy. The 
social services market (health care, education, 
home help, care for the elderly) is a growing 
labour markt. There are, however, differences 
between various countries with respect to the level 
in which social services spending leads to employ- 
ment creation. 
Martin Rein points at differences between the USA 
and Germany; these countries have comparable levels 
of health care spending but the corresponding 
employment ratio is 1.5 to 1. Hence, it is worth- 
while to take into account the employment effects 
of the various alternative possibilities for social 
services spending. 
b. Social security makes paid-non-work possible and 
thus influences the degree of participation in paid 
work. Paid-non-work like sickness-leave, mater- 
nity-leave, educational leave, holidays and so 
forth became institutionalized. But it is hardly 
measured statistically and thus not very visible. 
Martin Rein states that it is necessary to provide 
full insight into the magnitude of this 
paid-non-work phenomenon. Also because of the shift 
in boundaries between private and public arrange- 
ments from which these entitlements for 
paid-non-work originate, it is required to keep 
track of the size and the effects of the increasing 
parth of the work-force in paid-non-work. 
c. "Early exit" is another result of the social secu- 
rity system which strongly influences the partici- 
pation rate in the paid-work-force. During the 
1960's and 1970's this aspect of social policy 
became a main instrument in solving labour market 
problems related to economic phenomena like, 
de-industrialization and increased technological 
progress. Redundancy resulting from these trends in 
especially the manufacturing sectors was accomrno- 
dated by social policies which made early exit 
possible through early retirement schemes and 
through disabled schemes. 
Summarizing the first part of his introduction Martin 
Rein concludes that, at the level of the individual, the 
choice between work and leisure is an antagonistic one. 
At the macro level, however, social policies are comple- 
mentary to labour market policies, since they accomo- 
dates non-participation and enhance employment through 
the provision of social services. 
In the brief discussion that follows Ola Ribe (Norway) 
argues that in Scadinavian countries full employment is 
a goal in itself. Possibly social policy accommodates 
the realization of this goal, but social policy has its 
own intrinsic values. Willem Dercksen (The Netherlands) 
expresses his doubts as to the effectiveness of the 
arrangement of social services as an instrument for 
employment policies. Peter Bod (Hungary) adds that the 
high costs of social policies, which are financed by 
increasing costs of labour, have a counter productive 
effect on the employment goals. 
Martin Rein agrees with these points, but argues that in 
the past social policy made non-participation possible 
and at present and in the future social policies (in the 
broad sense of providing public services) will create 
employment and will thus enhance participation. In addi- 
tion some social services (e.g. heart-surgeries, univer- 
sities) are even capable of producing export-goods. 
11. In the second part of his introduction, Martin Rein 
dwells on the two other institutions in the sphere of 
labour market policy: 
- industrial relations; 
- active manpower system. 
He argues that an analysis of the effectiveness of 
labour market policy is only useful1 when such an 
analysis includes the two policies of the institutions 
mentioned above in conjunction with social policies. 
I11 In the third part of his introduction Martin Rein goes 
into the question of the Dutch choice regarding social 
policy and the creation of employment. 
He states that the USA route is succesfull with respect 
to employment generation as is the Swedish route. But 
the strategies employed in both countries differ com- 
pletely. The USA route emphasizes decentralization of 
the system of industrial relations (including wage 
negotiation); manpower institutions are weak and hardly 
integrated in the labour market policy. Furthermore, the 
USA has weak unions and a hardly developed system of 
employment protection. The rate of growth of wages is 
very low in this country. Social policies discourage 
early exit and paid-non-work (e.g. sick leave) in 
general. But the social services labour market is large 
with an continuous shift from public to private institu- 
tions (e.g. health, education). 
In addition, Martin Rein briefly depicts the contrary 
highly centralized Swedish situation: firms (have to) 
pay the same wages accross industries and sectors (which 
means that less productive industries go bankrupt). In 
Sweden manpower policies have been developed to upgrade 
the level of the labour force and social policies are 
strongly oriented towards labour market participation. 
The system of social policies, manpower policies and 
industrial relations is clearly interlinked and geared 
towards the integration of all people in the labour 
market. 
In view of the succesfullness of both systems with 
respect to employment creation and to increasing par- 
ticipation, Martin Rein discusses the options for Dutch 
policy makers: the Dutch choice. He states that in 
Holland, in contrast to Sweden, there is much discussion 
about choices, but that there is little or no change. In 
Sweden policies were changed (e.g. in favour of geo- 
graphic equity) without much discussion. The political 
discussion in Holland points at a lack of concensus on 
major strategies, which led to a sub-optimal-situation 
with ineffective policies: in all everyone pays more 
than necessary or gets less than possible. The present 
discussion in Holland is only about the need for employ- 
ment policy and not so much about social policies, which 
should be treated as complementary and in conjunction 
with direct employment policies. Martin Rein states that 
one can speak of a neglected choice in this respect: 
social policies on disabled schemes, early exit schemes, 
paid-non-work in general should be explicitly taken into 
account when speaking of labour market problems. If in 
the Netherlands a higher participation rate is desired, 
then schemes should be devised to do so, and lower 
productivity rates should be accepted as well as lower 
rates of growth of wages and unorthodox measures to use 
social benefits to top-up wages of less-abled partici- 
pants, and so forth. On the other hand the Netherlands 
can accept high productivity rates and a low level of 
employment and a high level of non-paid-work. A choice 
is necessary. One should realize, however, that a low 
unemployment level is no longer an appropriate measure 
of economic prosperity. 
In the finalizing discussion Ola Ribe (Norway) points at 
the contradiction of at the one hand the increasing need 
for social services (from the point of view of the 
consumers and of the need for employment) and on the 
other hand the increasing burden of financing such 
services. 
Martin Rein sees this problem very well, but to his 
opinion there is still ample scope for growth of employ- 
ment by increasing such services without - at the 
macro-level increasing public costs. This is possible 
when public spending is done in the most appropriate 
social services sectors and employment creation takes 
place at all levels and not only at the top. 
To Eric de Gier (The Netherlands), who questioned the 
uniqueness of the Dutch choice, Martin Rein answers that 
the'~utch situation is very much comparable to that in 
other continental European countries. 
- 4 .  SCOPE FOR GROWTH AND THE NEED FOR THE INCREASED 
PRODUCTION OF SERVICES 
by Gerard Keijzers, Staffmember of the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy, The Netherlands 
THE MODEL AND THE METHOD 
In 1987 The Netherlands' Scientific Council for Government 
Policy published the results of an econometric study into 
the growth perspectives of the Netherlands' economy on the 
medium-term, until 1995 (1). In this analysis an iterative 
optimization procedure is applied to an 18-sector dynamic 
input-output model. In this core-model no behavioural 
relations are included, but instead upper- and lower bounds 
are formulated which limit the sectoral growth opportunities 
of consumption, exports and thus of production levels. 
The essence of this approach is that room is being created 
for favourable economic developments which are not limited 
by constraints in the existing economic structure and in the 
present economic policy. Growth is not impeded by existing 
restricted behaviour of economic actors. After having thus 
defined this maximum room for economic growth, the analysis 
deals with the possible negative impact of constraints that 
may prevent the full use of this maximum growth potential. 
THE MODEL'S RESULTS 
The results of this analysis were rather surprising. In 
brief they entailed the following. It appeared that the 
growth-perspectives are much higher than is generally 
expected. It is also shown that, although the production of 
services is growing rapidly and is becoming increasingly 
important (also and especially form the perspective of 
(1) The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (WRR), Scoue for srowth: threats to and 
ouuortunities for the Dutch economy in the next ten 
years, 29th Report to the Government, WRR, The Hague, 
1987. 
employment growth), production and employment in the indus- 
trial sectors remain of crucial importance for the mainte- 
nance of internal and external economic equilibrium. One of 
the major dangers for prosperous growth concerns the rising 
relative prices of - labourintensive - services. The poor 
functioning of the labourmarket is another major cause of 
the slack economic growth. It also appeared that general 
deficiencies in the market mechanism and the high degree of 
penetration of the public in the private sectors, call for 
an improvement of the coordination of the decisions of 
economic actors. If this is not realized, then the continua- 
tion of such decentralized decision-making will sustain the 
situation of sub-optimal economic growth. 
It appeared that the present economic structure of the 
Netherlands as described in the model does not prohibit the 
attainment of growth rates of 4 or 5% per annum. This 
corresponds with the natural growth rate of 3% defined by 
the sum of the growth of the productivity of labour and of 
the growth of the labour force, increased by over 1.5% 
additional growth for the absorption of current unemploy- 
ment. Within six or seven years it would be possible to 
restore full employment and at the same time realize equi- 
librium on the balance of payments and decrease substan- 
tially the level of pollution. It appears that these varying 
objectives pertaining to production growth, employment, 
external balance and the internal environment are fully 
compatible and in some cases even form a condition for the 
realization of each other. Therefore, it was possible to 
conclude that neither the technical structure of the economy 
nor the desire to simultaneously pursue the mentioned goals, 
rule out the progress towards the various ambitious target 
levels of these objectives. Then.an employment growth of 2% 
per annum will become feasible. This additional input of 
labour will be concentrated in the labour-intensive fields 
of services of health care, care of the elderly and other 
consumer oriented personal services, as well as in commer- 
cial business services. The industrial demand for labour in 
manufacturing will rise only marginally, while that in 
agriculture declines. 
A number of significant conditions do, however, need to be 
satisfied. Total consumption needs to rise with 4% per 
annum. A relatively strong growth of the consumption of 
industrial products from the electrotechnical, chemical and 
metalproducts sectors is needed. Other strong growing 
sectors concern health care and personal care, whereas the 
consumption of education is expected to stabilize at the 
present level. The model results indicate room for increas- 
ing consumer budget shares for services and less room for 
the consumption of material essentials as food, energy and 
housing. A substantial increase in the investment ratio is 
another prerequisite for growth as is the need for exports 
to' rise at an annual rate of about 5%. If the crucial con- 
ditions regarding growth of consumption, exports and invest- 
ment are not met, then it will not be possible to lower the 
present excessively high unemployment figure. The growth 
potential as outlined above may be an interesting perspec- 
tive, which the Council has felt necessary to describe in 
detail, it is not an optimistic message to the economic 
actors and policy makers. It rather is an urgent call upon 
them to overcome the existing growth-inhibiting factors and 
to share the risks to be taken, to fully utilize the exis- 
ting growth potential of the Netherlands' economy. Some of 
the growth-impeding factors concern problems related to the 
rising cost of services, which are discussed below. 
THE RISING COSTS OF SERVICES 
For employment to grow on the scale required to absorb the 
anticipated supply of labour, a real growth in the consump- 
tion of .labour-intensive services is required. Sectoral 
surveys and model calculations indicate a high rate of 
growth of sales and employment in these sectors to be both 
feasible and desirable. In particular, this applies to 
consumer-oriented personal services provided on both a 
commercial and a non-profit basis. Examples include the 
hotel and catering trade, the repair of consumer goods, 
sports and recreation, care of the elderly and home help, 
socio-cultural work and health care. These sectors incor- 
porate nearly half of total employment in the Netherlands. 
These are areas in which the rise in the productivity of 
labour tends to lag behind that in the economy as a whole, 
while wage rises will in all probability need to keep 
broadly in step with the macro-economic growth in produc- 
tivity. A relative increase in the price of these services 
may therefore be expected, which could then affect the level 
of demand for them. It may also further discourage the 
government to collectively offer and finance these services. 
Of course, the tendency of increasing relative prices of 
labour-intensive products and services is not new. An over- 
view of this development in the passed twenty-five years is 
given below. It is seen that this proces continues and leads 
to substantial changes in the sectoral structure of prices 
(table 1) 
Table 1 Absolute and relative chanaes in the sectoral price 
structure in the Netherlands. 1963-1987 
(1) (2) 




Agriculture 172 55 
Manufacturing 229 73 
Construction 382 123 
Trade 293 94 
Transport 241 77 
Banking, business 530 170 
services 
Catering ind., personal 740 238 
services 
Health care, education 710 228 
Public services (b) 533 171 
10. Total average price index 311 100 
Source: Scientific Council for Government Policy, 1988. 
Notes: 
(a) Relative prices are computed by dividing the 
sectoral prices index 1987 by the total average 
price index 1987. 
(b) Concerns the wage increase index of public servants. 
In column 1 of table 1 the sectoral price index figures 
(1963 to 1987) are given. It is clearly seen that sectoral 
price developments were quite divergent. In column 2 
relative prices per sector are shown, which were found by 
dividing the sectoral price index figure (1987) by the index 
figure of the average price development. A closer look at 
column 2 learns that e.g. the price increase of agricultural 
products (55) was about half the increase of the average 
prices figure (100) for the period 1963-1987. Since prices 
of business services, health care and education rose twice 
as fast as the average price figure, they therefore, 
increased four times as fast as the prices of agricultural 
products and three times as fast as industrial prices. 
The picture becomes clear. Prices in agriculture and rnanu- 
facturing fall, relatively. The same goes for prices in 
trade and transport. In these sectors increases in labour 
productivity were realized and the gains were passed on to 
the consumers. Prices in all other services sectors rose 
steeply. 
The same pattern of development is expected to show in the 
future. Labour productivity developments, which are the main 
determinant of price-developments, will futher diverge. And 
again, especially the' production of services will suffer. If 
the demand for these services should fail to materialize (at 
least within the regular economy), an important springboard 
for economic growth would then be removed. In the model 
calculations the council has tested a scenario in which the 
consumption of these non-profit services was deliberately 
cut back sharply. In the optimizations this caused a decline 
in the production of services which could partly be compen- 
sated by an increased industrial production output and 
employment growth.,But the overall result was negative: 
consumers got far less services than they desired, employ- 
ment growth dropped, with the average unemployment level 
nearly 100,000 man years (50%) up. 
- POSSIBLE STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE 
Encouraging the growth of labour-intensive services by 
holding back relative price rises is possible to only a 
limited extent. A general reduction in the difference 
between gross wage costs and net pay is not in prospect and 
would in any case be of limited effectiveness only. Given 
the 4:l ratio between the price of an hour's services 
(namely net wage + social insurance contributions + payroll 
tax + overheads + VATT) and the net model hourly wage, the 
size of the reduction required would be such as to rule out 
general measures. The same goes for the problem of high and 
increasing costs of health care, education and help for the 
elderly. General measures such as reducing the gross wage 
costs would imply such enormous amounts of money, that they 
cannot be seriously considered. 
A system of wage differentiation between industries with 
differing productivity growth rates would result in loss of 
quality and an inadequate supply of labour. Nor would such 
an arrangement afford a lasting solution to these structural 
problems, which are related to the nature of technical 
progress. Hence, general reduction of wage costs and of 
sectoral wage differentiation are not considered to be 
possible strategies for the increased production of labour 
intensive services. 
Curbing of price rises by increases in the efficiency of 
production and organization of services, must be considered 
an important strategy. At a practical level, government and 
industry should continue to promote higher labour produc- 
tivity in order to alleviate the problem of rising costs for 
labour-intensive services. Although there are technical 
limits, this strategy has been and is being succesfully 
applied in the field of tertiary services. 
For example in hotels and restaurants, in trade, barber- 
shops, cleaning businesses and so forth remarkable successes 
have been obtained regarding the increase in labour produc- 
tivity and thus in the curbing of price rises. In the 
collectively financed and organized labour intensive service 
production (health care, care for the elderly, etc.) such 
efficiency improvements were far less substantial. The 
impression exists that improvements are quite well posible, 
but incentives to realize them appear absent. Which may be 
partly due to the existing collective financing structure. 
Another strategy for the increased formal production of 
labour intensive services is discouraging illegitimate and 
informal production in those fields. A general reduction of 
gross wage costs is not possible, but consideration should 
be given to shortening the gross-nett wage trajectory in 
special cases, particulary where market forces are being 
distorted by the black economy..In such selected sub-sectors 
exemptions for the payment of wage taxes and social premiums 
could be extended. 
One of the major present problems for the increased produc- 
tion of services concerns the budgetary pressure of the 
government. This pressure caused government cuts on essen- 
tial expenditures in the fields of health care, education, 
etc. Potential growth sectors were thus limited in their 
desired social and economic development. The main question 
which then arises is, whether it is possible to meet this 
growing demand for collectively financed public services 
without automatically increasing the tax and social premiums 
burden. The answer to this question cannot be either yes or 
no. 
Some public services are being and will be delivered under 
the sole responsibility of the government. Privatization is 
therefore out of the question; e.g. police, defence, public 
administration, the administration of justice and - large 
parts - of education. 
The possibilities to reduce the burden of our education 
system are equally limited. The development of an adequate 
level of the existing human capital demands a big invest- 
ment. Economizing on these expenditures would be 
counter-productive. Of course, the government has to realize 
an efficient and cost conscious educational system, but is 
responsible for a system that meets the demands in this 
respect. Economizing because of the fact that wages in this 
sector increase, will lead to an inadequate educational 
system. 
In other fields of public and collectively financed services 
there is more scope for de-collectivization and privatiza- 
tion. In the mentioned report of the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy "Scope for growth" it is pointed out that 
the rate of growth of social services and health care does 
not necessarily need to be less than the high rates of 
growth of these sectors realized in the past two decades. 
However, the budgetary pressures and the rising wage costs 
might be used as arguments to reduce public expenditures in 
these fields. This would be against the proved desires of 
the public, who are willing to pay the higher price for 
these services if only it were made possible to acquire 
these very services. In this respect privatization or rather 
de-collectivization of social services and health care would 
extend the scope for growth in there fields. The introduc- 
tion of new forms of price and cost incentives are needed to 
better inform the suppliers of and those in need of such 
services. 
De-collectivization of the financing and organization of the 
production of these services is desirable, as it is expected 
to enhance the efficiency of production and to stimulate a 
growth according to the preferences of consumers. Prefer- 
ences which imply a much higher demand for such services 
than is realized by the centralized public production at 
present. However, strict regulations are needed then to 
ensure the general acces and availability of such vital 
services as health and social services are. 
Another strategy implies the need to counter the general 
tendency to include socially useful services in the collec- 
tively financed public services package. There is quite a 
number of services which do not necessarily need to become 
or need to remain public services. E.g. child care, parts of 
the training facilities, might as well be or may better be 
privatized. 
CONCLUSION 
The government is confronted with the task of resolving 
problems on the supply side - namely the high tax and social 
charges burden - without at the same time creating fresh 
problems on the demand side of the economy by drastically 
cutting the volume of services. In a prosperous society, a 
higher price will have to be paid for traditional government 
functions (e.g. defence, public admin., the administration 
of justice and education). The same applies to the broad 
field of social services and health care, although in these 
cases there.is some scope for a certain degree of privatiza- 
tion, thereby permitting a less restrictive link with tax 
rates and social insurance changes. The continuing growth of 
labour intensive services appears to be desirable from a 
social viewpoint, indispensable from the perspective of 
employment creation, essential as a dynamic element in the 
economic process of production and income generation. 
The public and the government have to get used to the 
increasing price of these services, as it must be paid. 
- Plenary discussion in connection with "Scoue for arowth and 
the need for the increased ~roduction of servicesw bv Gerard 
Kevzers 
(chairman Seppo Moisio, rapporteur Erik de Gier) 
After Gerard Kevzers' (The Netherlands) presentation Peter 
Bod (Hungary) was asked to give a first comment. 
Peter Bod focused in his reaction on the differences and 
similarities between the Netherlands and Hungary.' Though 
there are basic differences between these two countries, 
there are also some striking similarities. Different for 
instance is one of the central economic goals. In Holland 
the government tries to improve the working of the labour 
market in order to reduce the high unemployment-rate. In 
contrast to the Netherlands, the rise of incomes seems to be 
far more important as an economoc goal in Hungary. Similar 
in both countries is the use of mathematic economic models. 
Peter Bod stated on the model results of 'Scope for growth' 
the following more specific points: 
it will be difficult to re-employ all long term unem- 
ployed in Holland because of their low productivity. A 
national economic growth of 4 to 5 percent will there- 
fore not be sufficient; 
a problem will also be the low productivity in the 
labour intensive services, which are projected to grow 
intensively; 
a substantial decrease of unemployment in the Nether- 
lands will probably lead to a negative work ethic; 
more efficiency will not stimulate employment. 
his turn Gerard Kevzers underlined the importance of 
organizing efficient labour intensive services. Though this 
will not always be positive for the creation of new employ- 
ment, it is necesarry for curbing costs. Otherwise there 
could easily be immediate cut backs. Moreover an efficient 
services sector will stimulate the development of the indus- 
trial sector. A point of special interest is the current 
rather weak position of workers in the services sector, 
which is partly due to the low productivity levels realized 
in these sectors. The strongest interest groups in society 
will gain most in the process of welfare distribution. 
Referring to a remark on how to prevent pollution of the 
environment in case of high economic growth, ~erard Kevzers 
stated that something may be expected from changing tech- 
nologies, but that large investments at high costs will be 
necessarry to protect environment. 
Michal Malawski (Poland) entered the discussion by giving 
some specific information on his country. In Poland the most 
appropriate national strategy is not any longer coordination 
of different interests (miners, agriculture) in parliament. 
As was experienced in the past such a strategy will stimu- 
late economic inflation. From now on marketization and 
privatization will be superior strategies in the collective 
state-guided Polish economy. These strategies may also 
contribute to a reduction of pollution. 
Willem Dercksen (The Netherlands) didn't agree with the 
opinion that efficiency strategies will not in all cases 
generate service employment. Efficiency strategies might 
create possibilities for better skilled and educated workers 
in health care and education. 
Heikki Palm (Finland) argued that private decentralized 
services will often be more expensive than state services. 
Ola Ribe (Norway) asked for clarification about what was 
meant in the WRR-report with the poor functioning of the 
labour market? A second question concerned the development 
of relative costs in Sweden and the United States, as 
compared to the Netherlands. 
In his reply on the different remarks and questions Gerard 
Kevzers noted that, contrary to Poland, a strategy of 
marketization of decisions in the Netherlands will in the 
end prove contra-productive. It will not lead to higher 
investments in services. The state has to take the first 
steps to show the employers and the unions that it is 
prepared to share the risks of investment. He agreed with 
the opinion that efficient services can also attract higher 
educated workers. More efficiency doesn't necessary conflict 
with more employment. 
Though Gerard Kevzers does not know the development of rela- 
tive prices in Sweden and the USA, he assumes that there 
will be only slight differences with Holland. 
Michel Gas~ard (France) wondered whether it would be 
possible to separate growth of the service sector from 
macro-economic growth. Then Health, Education and Welfare 
could function as a closed economy as such. Consequently a 
"closed" service sector may lead to an increasing demand of 
services and employment. A real problem of linking the 
service economy with other parts of the national economy is 
that the logic of productivity in the services sector is 
principally different (more qualitative). Until now an 
adequate standard to measure productivity in services is not 
available. If it can be proven that labour productivity 
growth is high, then workers have a legitimate reason for 
asking higher wages. If the standard measures improvements 
in the quality of services, then prices will rise. Higher 
prices then imply higher quality, but may also indicate 
lower productivity. Higher productivity has been difficult 
to measure. 
Finally, Michel Gas~ard remarked that as far as there is a 
real choice between decentralization and collectivization, 
experiences in France show that a combination of market and 
collective elements can be very succesful; for instance in 
the health sector. He isn't very optimistic about positive 
effects of decentralization. 
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION. OF THE CONFERENCE 
by Simon Miles (Canada) 
We will each conduct our own evaluations of the conference 
in terms of its relevances for our own countries. To quote 
Peter Bod "I don't think I can do justice to the excellent 
work that has gone into these discussions". It is a tradi- 
tion of these meetings that the host country puts before us 
a set of issues that it is struggling with, that it also 
senses we are struggling with, and on which it would welcome 
some insights. The original title of this seminar was: "The 
consequences of changing responsibilities between the state, 
the market and the intermediate sector for redistribution 
policies". I think we have had some useful insights first 
from the Dutch, and then from us visitors, in response to 
the Dutch, on some of the consequences of that shift in 
responsibilities. But really, I suppose our two host insti- 
tutions, as advisors to the government, want to know what we 
think are likely to be the most productive areas of activity 
for the Dutch welfare state in the forseeable future, as it 
attempts to respond to the needs of the Dutch people within 
this changing context. This seems to be the "bottom line" on 
which we can focus this summary and evaluation. As I 
suggested in my paper, if we are to provide this type of 
advice we have to have a reasonable picture of what the 
Dutch people need and even what they want. 
I think we have helped to clarify that picture of Dutch 
needs and wants, although there is still a lot more clarifi- 
cation needed. We see a medium sized country in European 
terms becoming increasingly conscious that it is a small 
country in global terms and that this is increasingly sig- 
nificant as it becomes conscious of its loss of external 
sovereignty - that affects not just its economic policy but 
also its social and environmental policy manoeuvrability. 
While this is true for all countries it is felt most by 
small countries. We see a society that has allowed full 
development of groups around particular interests. We see 
tensions in the society emerging as the economic pie - while 
growing - fails to grow just enough to enable the welfare 
state to satisfy all of those interests. - The internal 
sovereignty is being underminded. We hear, that there are 
new pressures emerging: 50% of the children under 15 in 
Amsterdam are born to immigrants. There is an erosion of the 
old socio-cultural way of life. The enormity of the change 
while everywhere, is harder to take, perhaps, in a small 
country. 
Thus it is not surprising that, as consensus is threatened, 
there is a search for a new unifying force. This may be 
shaping up in the notion of the responsibilities (more so 
than the rights, to make the point) of citizenship in a 
pluralistic society. 
This, I sense, is one of the most fundamental needs of the 
Dutch that I have heard about in the three days here. I see 
it as an expression of the importance of the quality of the 
ligatures, or associations, or bounds, between people in 
Dutch society, that I spoke about the other day. 
Bringing about this sense of citizenship will be difficult. 
It is probable that rights will have to be earned by 
preparedness to exercise reponsibilities rather than simply 
provided. They will be earned and enjoyed within an environ- 
ment of human well-being, the quality of which will depend 
very much on how and, just as importantly, how well one 
defines the product sought, as Martin Rein put it. The 
"product" is in my view to be defined in terms of human 
development - a person with the ability to respond cre- 
atively and in a self-reliant manner to new situations; and 
with the opportunity to enjoy good quality associations with 
people, places and things. The abilities and opportunities 
are interrelated. Abilities develop taking advantage of the 
opportunities. Since people spend so much of their time at 
work - paid or unpaid - it will be necessary to look more 
closely at the opportunities for work that is fulfulling and 
still demanding something of people. 
It seems that the Dutch have already realized as a body 
politic that it is not necessary to work all the time. What 
we didn't hear enough about and will need looking at is not 
just whether the 48% who don't participate in the labour 
force are happy, but whether they are exercising their human 
capacit'ies in ways that enables them to be reasonably 
self-reliant individuals and, in this way exercising their 
responsibilities in society. 
The answer is probably NO. The implication is likely that 
more jobs have to be created by the growth in the soci,al 
sector. We Europeans are probably not as surprised as 
Americans appear to be that social policy can be seen as a 
labour market instrument, but I suspect we recognize that 
the cost of the labour will limit this growth. As regards 
the growth in the economic sector, we Europeans with the 
leadership of Brundtland are recognizing that there can be a 
new form of growth that is sustainable through the wise use 
of technology and knowledge. What we perhaps still have to 
understand is that it is not really the growth we want to 
sustain, but the human-societal development. This seminar 
has taken us a little but nearer that realization. 
I1 PAPERS OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
6. THE WRR-REPORT ON ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
Willem Dercksen (the   ether lands) 
This report is concerned with the type of labour market 
policy which, given the potential for economic growth, is 
required in the Netherlands in order to engage as large a 
part of the working population in the labour process. An 
important starting-point for this report is the conclusion 
reached in Scoue for Growth, that the technical and economic 
structure of the Dutch economy does not preclude the possi- 
bility that unemployment could be eliminated and the growing 
supply of labour deployed over the next ten years (1). The 
achievement of these objectives is, however, dependent in a 
number of conditions, among which an effectively operating 
labour market. 
Two developments in the labour market provide particular 
reasons for formulating an active labour market policy. In 
the first place, the phenomenon of long-term unemployment is 
at present the major problem in the labour market. For the 
purposes of this report, long-term unemployment has been 
taken as including the unregistered unemployment of women 
who wish to return to the labour market. Such unemployment 
hardly appears in the official unemployment statistics. 
Secondly, there is the problem of hard-to-fill vacancies. 
Although not on any great scale, the existence of this 
problem at a time of high unemployment does point to imper- 
fections in the labour market. 
The level and largely long-term nature of unemployment is 
regarded as unacceptable. This applies all the more since 
unemployment hits the weakest groups in Dutch society dis- 
proportionately hard. The major inequality in Dutch society 
today is that between those in work, or with prospects of 
(1) The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (WRR), Scoue for urowth: threats to and Ouuor- 
tunities for the Dutch economy in the next ten Years, 
29th Report to the Government, WRR, The Hague, 1987. 
finding employment, and those who have found themselves 
permanently excluded from the labour system. This inequality 
is not just inherently unacceptable but also constitutes a 
threat to social stability in the medium to long term. 
During the remainder of this decade and indeed for the rest 
of this century, employment will unquestionably remain a 
factor of fundamental importance for individual self-devel- 
opment and for determining individuals' place in society. 
Although many people manage to lead a satisfying existence 
outside the labour system at certain stages of their lives, 
the labour system does constitute the major source of pros- 
perity in present-day society. In addition a position in the 
labour system generates respect for others and a sense of 
self-respect. It is in the labour system that people are 
able to discover and develop their potential; it is no acci- 
dent that access to the labour system has been an important 
precondition for the emancipation of women. 
Since 1983 there has once again been a rise in the number of 
vacancies. Following the low point touched in October 1982 
of 17,000 vacancies, the number of vacancies is now esti- 
mated at over 70,000 (the number of jobs is about 4 . 7  mil- 
lion). The proportion of hard-to-fill vacancies has risen in 
recent years and now amounts to 48% of the total. On the 
basis of various surveys conducted in this field, the 
problem would appear to be at its most pronounced in rela- 
tion to jobs for which vocational training is required. A 
significant proportion of the hard-to-fill vacancies - some 
30% - relates to jobs calling for higher training (i.e. 
skilled craftsmen). 
The background to the phenomenon of long-term vacancies at a 
time of high unemployment is provided by two types of fac- 
tors: recruitment factors and qualitative discrepancies in 
the labour market. 
"Recruitment factors" is a catch-all phrase covering lack of 
familiarity with of ability to exploit the labour market. 
This can result in incorrect or inadequate signals being 
issued by the labour market, so that supply and demand fail 
to match up, or only with some delay. "Qualitative dis- 
crepancies" in the labour market refer to imbalances between 
demand and supply. This may derive from skill shortages, 
lack of experience, the popular image of a particular 
company or industry, the conditions of employment and the 
degree of mobility on the part of employees and employers. 
The proposed active labour market policy may be outlined in 
terms of four features. 
In the first place the policy sets out in various ways to 
promote labour mobility. This need arises from the dynamism 
of the market economy, technological developments and 
socio-cultural changes, as well as the growing participation 
of women in the labour market. The report indicates that 
shifts in the sectoral pattern of employment will take place 
in both an expanding and a stagnating economy. These shifts 
can be accommodated not just be entry to and departure from 
the labour force (e.g. school-leavers, re-entrants and those 
reaching retirement age) but also demand mobility on the 
part of those in and out of work. Technological developments 
cause certain professions and jobs to disappaer while gener- 
ating others. This again demands labour mobility. Finally, 
socio-cultural processes of change such as individualization 
and the increasing participation of women in the labour 
system generate a demand for different patterns of labour 
from those in the past. This will have a greater chance of 
succeeding the more mobile the labour force. 
Secondly, an active labour market policy also involves 
facilitating an active orientation (or reorientation) on the 
part of the unem~lownent towards their ~rosuects in the 
labour market. In the absence of job prospects, participa- 
tion in training or job-experience schemes (a specifically 
Dutch proposal) should form an automatic means of obtaining 
initial or new qualifications for the labour market. 
Provided there are sufficient facilities for labour market 
orientation/reorientation, these can then be complemented by 
means of sanctions within the social security system. 
Thirdly, the proposed active labour market policy takes as 
its starting point the reoraanization of manpower services 
on a tripartite basis. In 1988, the government intends 
making the Directorate-General for Manpower and the regional 
manpower services - which currently come under the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment - autonomous and providing 
them with a tripartite administration. This implies that 
manpower services will no longer be the sole responsibility 
of the central government but will be shared by it with 
local government and the social partners. A tripartite 
Central Manpower Services Board is to be established, with 
an independent chairman, presiding over a central manpower 
office and regional manpower offices. The main focus under 
the new structure would be on the regional administrations 
and offices. Within the - often financial - frameworks laid 
down centrally, the regional administrations will conduct 
their own policies, for implementation by the regional 
off ices. 
Finally an active labour market policy must be characterized 
by a straiahtforward and effective set of instruments based 
on a consistent approach towards labour market policy. The 
report notes that, as it stands, Dutch labour market policy 
covers an excessive number of instruments, and that these 
instruments are not always properly coordinated. In essence 
the future set of instruments could consist of a single 
framework regulation for job-experience places, a single 
framework for training and retraining, supplemented by a 
single facility for educational and careers counselling, a 
facility for setting up new businesses, facilities for 
direct and indirect job placement and a wage supplement 
regulation. To this may be added the proposals to increase 
the flexibility of the labour market. The effectiveness of 
the various instruments will need to be regularly evaluated, 
and the instruments themselves adjusted where necessary. The 
necessary flexibility of labour market policy can be 
promoted by the introduction of market and bargaining 
principles. If for example the public employment offices 
were no longer to act as a supplier but just as a source of 
demand in the training market, they would then find them- 
selves in the position of applying labour market consider- 
ations only with respect to the procurement (i.e. subsi- 
dization) of specific training places for the target group. 
NOW the Dutch'manpower services include Centres for voca- 
tional training. In a system of job-experience places based 
on negotiations between employers'associations and trade 
unions the number of places can be regularly adjusted in 
line with the room afforded by the labour market. 
The Report makes proposals in relation to four fields of 
labour market policy: placement, training, job-experience 
places and employment flexibility. 
A main proposal in the field of placement is the authoriza- 
tion by government of commercial placement services in addi- 
tion to the public placement services. Commercial enterprise 
can play an effective part in improving the allocation of 
labour. Guarantees to protect those seeking work against 
abuses could be provided by a licensing system. For reasons 
of efficiency, it is important that the public employment 
offices will be the only bodies within the public service to 
perform direct or indirect job placement. 
Traininq can make a significant contribution to the effec- 
tive coordination of demand and supply in both a curative 
and a preventive sense. The existing Dutch system of 
off-the-job training facilities does not measure up to the 
requirements. Technological and economic developments cause 
the qualifications obtained by employees through initial 
vocational training to get out of date rapidly. Together 
with the emergence of demands for new kinds of jobs, this 
creates a requirement for continued training opportunities 
for those in and seeking work, to which off-the-job training 
facilities may provide an answer. On account of the con- 
tinuing uncertainties surrounding the qualitative needs of 
the labour market, a system of off-the-job training facili- 
ties is also important in order to match up vocational 
training with the labour market. As it stands, the central 
education planning which is designed to gear the capacity 
and content of vocational training to the demand for labour 
does not achieve the desired object. More could be achieved 
by means of effective interaction between vocational 
training and regional industry, with the training being 
geared to regional requirements. 
A further streamlining of the system of off-the-job training 
can be achieved alon the following lines. Training organized 
on an industry basis is of major importance for companies 
unable to organize the necessary training themselves. In the 
case of companies with internal training facilities, 
training at industry level can act as a valuable supplement, 
since companies tend to be selective in relation to both 
participants and the content of on-the-job training. 
Financing could come from the training funds administered by 
the social partners. The resources for the fund should in 
the first place come from employers, but, since their posi- 
tion in the labour market will be improved by the training, 
employees may also be expected to make a contribution. Part 
of the scope wage increases could be set aside for this 
purpose in the collective bargaining process. Government 
contributions could remain limited to the initial stage and 
focus on the development costs of courses and direct 
training costs. 
The way in which training is organized will depend heavily 
on the nature of the industry. A choice can be made between 
an integrated approach, in which the industry-based facili- 
ties comprise refresher training, retraining and further 
training as well as an initial vocational training course, 
or a coordinating approach, consisting for example of a 
catalogue of further-training courses in companies and 
institutions, with agreements on certificates and industry 
diplomas. In the case of training organized on an industry 
basis, stronger links with the apprenticeship system would 
be an obvious course of action. 
On account of the fact that public employment offices are 
able to reimburse the costs of participation in training for 
unemployed, they in principle can enjoy a strong position on 
the demand side of a (regional) training market. As such the 
public employment services will need to exploit this finan- 
cial capacity to open up certain forms of occupational and 
industrial training to the unemployed and re-entrants when 
this contributes towards an improvement in labour market 
prospects. Agreements reached in the frame of collective 
bargaining might also help in expending the range of labour 
market relevant training facilities. 
For long-term unemployment persons or women seeking to 
re-enter the labour market, the lack of work ex~erience 
- often combined with a lack of training of skills for which 
there is little demand - acts as a major obstacle to 
entering the regular labour market. At times of high 
unemployment the lack of these skills can form an insuper- 
able and self-reinforcing problem. The provision of possi- 
bilities for acquiring relevant work experience forms a 
necessary part of any labour market policy setting out 
seriously to tackle unemployment in a curative and preven- 
tive sense. 
A characteristic feature of job-experience places is 
"learning by doing", in which respect the learning can be an 
explicit element of the job but also a more implicit one, in 
the sense that participants are provide with opportunities 
to practise skills considered necessary for certain occupa- 
tions or functions. 
An important feature of the proposed job-experience places 
is that they do not have to be by way of superfluous jobs. 
The distinctive feature is that selection criteria would be 
laid down for the participants. Implementation of the policy 
would be decentralized. Employing organizations would be 
responsible for generating the required places and also for 
the job description and the recruitment and placement of the 
target group. The delimitation of the target group would 
need to be agreed centrally; it might for example include 
persons who had been unemployment for over a year, women 
re-entering the work-force and early school-leavers. 
The most promising way of building up a system of job-expe- 
rience places would be through collective bargaining based 
on a nationally agreed commitment of central employers and 
employees associations. This national undertaking could then 
find concrete expression in separate collective labour 
agreements with reference to: 
the number of job-experience places to be created 
(e.g.l% of the total number of employees); 
the time-frame within which the system was to be intro- 
duced, and the way in which normal wastage should be 
taken advantage of; 
exceptions (e.g. small businesses and organizations); 
pay/terms of employment; 
alternatives (e.g. participation in a labour pool of 
unemployment persons and re-entrants); 
provision for some form of compensatory payment to be 
made where job-experience places are not instituted 
(e.g. payments to manpower agencies). 
Greater em~lownent flexibility in the fourth major element 
in the proposed active labour market policy. Greater flexi- 
bility with create job openings for the long-term unemployed 
and re-entrants and will help prevent hard-to-fill vacan- 
cies. Greater employment flexibility in the Dutch labour 
market is possible by widening the officiel scope for tempo- 
rary employment. A relaxation of the official regulations 
governing working hours is another important "framework" 
measure for increasing employees' (functional) flexibility. 
Promoting the mobility of labour is a key element in the 
proposed active labour market policy. To this end the allo- 
cative function of wages need to be strengthened. Redis- 
tribution of labour can also help towards tackling the 
problem of unemployment in the coming years. The scope for 
shorter working hours - assuming that' business hours will 
remark the same, or expend - and part-time work would by no 
means appear to have been exhausted. 
The active labour market policy proposed in this report will 
have consequences for the division of labour. Given the 
present high level of unemployment, the provision of 
job-experience places and training and the introduction of 
flexible contractual arrangements forming part of an active 
labour market policy will in the first place increase the 
availability of suitable labour without, however, raising 
the number of jobs to the required level. It would, however, 
mean that the burden of the lack of jobs did not devolve 
solely onto the shoulders of a single category, namely the 
long-term unemployed. A greater number of people would be 
confronted with unemployment, if for shorter periods. 
Needless to say this "rotation" of unemployment would 
steadily shrink as unemployment began to decline. 
Another possible short-term effect of an active labour 
market policy is that the introduction of job-experience 
places and temporary jobs could to some extent displace 
fixed jobs. On the other hand, flexible employment arrange- 
ments and training could contribute towards an expansion of 
the existing level of employment. 
Implicitly, the proposals rely heavily on commitment and a 
sense of responsibility on the part of employers and employ- 
ees for the functioning of the labour market. That commit- 
ment and sense of responsibility will need to manifest 
itself in a willingness to set aside funds or bear part of 
the costs. As noted earlier, putting the manpower services 
system on a successful tripartite basis is more than just a 
matter of changing the administrative quard. It also calls 
for the coordination of negotiated conditions of employment 
with labour market policy. The financial participation of 
companies and organizations in aspects of labour market 
policy will moreover provide an incentive for the resources 
to be used in such a way as to maximize the labour market 
relevance of the facilities. 
Finally it is noted that a tripartite responsibility for 
labour market policy is not without its risks. The possi- 
bility of success - and hence also of failure - will depend 
on the extent to which those concerned are able to reach 
agreement. There would, however, be no alternative to fall 
back on. A labour market policy can be effective only to the 
extent that it is carried by the actors in the labour 
market. The Report is based on the assumption that the 
proposed active labour market policy is consistent with that 
carrying capacity. 
7. POSSIBILITY AND CONTENTS OF AN ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET 
POLICY - SOME CONDITIONS 
by Ola Ribe (Norway) 
Governmental expenditure on different active manpower 
measures (training, apprenticeships, supplementary wages 
a.0.) in relation to the expenditure on the more passive 
unemployment benefit is an often used indicator to charac- 
terize the labour market policy. And in that sense Norway is 
pursuing an active labour market policy. 
A closer analysis of an active labour market policy has to 
be taken into account if the measures promote changes in the 
industrial structures, or mainly contribute to conserve the 
structures of today. Another aspect is the allocation of 
resources between the different (strong/week) unemployed 
groups in the labour market. In this paper I will not focus 
on these topics. But rather take into consideration two 
factors which are of great importance for the possibility of 
employment and the content of an active labour market 
policy. These two factors are the wage-settling process and 
the regionalization of the labour market policy. 
THE WAGE BARGAINING PROCESS 
Traditionally the governmental labour market policy in 
Norway has been limited to deal with the quantum side of the 
labour market. The wagesettling or priceside of the market 
is the responsibility of other governmental authorities. 
A main problem in the Norwegian economy is a stronger price 
and wage growth than our major trading partners. The wage 
settlements therefore are of great importance concerning the 
function and the adjustment on the labour market. 
Central wage settlements were the main system in the 1950's 
and the 1960's. This so-called "Scandinavian Modelu was a 
tripartite system where the government played an active 
role. The social-democratic government, in close cooperation 
- with the largest trade union, made this a successful and 
well functioning model. 
The economic development in the 1970's and the 1980's has 
not been satisfactory. There has been a widening of infla- 
tion differential between Norway and other OECD countries. 
This has created a growth in the costs especially in the old 
fashioned industries. These industries are now facing a 
great need for structural changes. This situation indicates 
that more emphasis should be given to the supply side of the 
economy with more focus on a well functioning market through 
competition and reduced industrial subsidies. 
The right wing (from 1981), later right-centrum coalition 
cabinet limited the governmental role in the wage settle- 
ments. 
- They reduced the influence of the major trade union and 
increased the influence of other trade unions. 
- They were less interested to participate directly in the 
wagesettling process, but instead announced their income 
policy on beforehand (tax reductions a.0.). 
The competition among the different labour unions resulted 
in higher wage claims. On the other hand the government was 
not willing to accept more unemployment. High level on 
labour market measures and an expansive economic policy led 
to a tight labour market situation which gave little help 
for the employer to resist high wage claims. This led to a 
situation with high inflation and depreciation of the 
Norwegian krone, 
This less favorable results of the market orientation led to 
a change back to the "old" centralized model when the social 
democratic government again came into office in 1986 (in 
1988 we have a parliamentary act fixing the maximum amount 
of wage increasing). 
REGIONALISATION OF LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
Regionalization of the labour market policy is a heat sub- 
ject at the time in Norway. This discussion is linked to the 
- "free-local governmentw experiments; delegation of govern- 
mental resources and decisions to local government. The 
discussion did not have its start in dissatisfaction with 
the status of the regional labour market policy today, but 
rather with the general regional development and high 
ambitions for the regional policy itself. 
Now I will shortly mention the main alternatives we are 
discussing for regionalization of the labour market measures 
to the provincial level. Today the Directorate of Labour has 
18 provincial labour market offices and 108 local labour 
off ices. 
The most radical alternative is to give all the money allo- 
cated for labour market measures to the actual local govern- 
ments and let them use the money in the best way for the 
labour market (not only on labour market measures but for 
example on the ordinary education system). 
This has led to focus on the factors used for allocation of 
the measures between the different geographical areas. To 
calculate total governmental resources spent on labour 
market measures may be difficult if national goals change 
with different goals in each local area. 
The changes in the system as mentioned above will include a 
change in goals for the labour market policy. The govern- 
mental goals have to be recommendations and the local 
authorities can decide themselves how much of the grants 
they wish to channel1 towards the unemployed. 
An alternative is to coordinate grants for labour market 
measures and regional development funds to improve local 
industry and the job creation process. 
The resources for labour market measures today are mainly 
for qualifying unemployed persons to help them fit the 
demand of the vacancy. That means priority to the weaker 
job-seekers. A policy focusing on creating employment may be 
in favour of quite another group of persons (the inno- 
vators). Indirectly that may be in favour of unemployed, but 
in a non-systematic and less effective way. 
A third model of delegation concerning power and local 
influence is to establish a special fund which has to be run 
after guidelines given by the central government. For 
example keeping unemployment low, giving priority to unem- 
ployed youth and qualifications measures. 
Under such a framework the local authorities can develop 
their own measures and make more detailed guidelines. If it 
is preferable to have the same types of measures in all 
parts of the country and promote cost-effectiveness one can 
reduce the local decisions to choose among centrally 
accepted types of measures. 
A fourth way of decentralization is to decentralize the 
Directorate of Labour and give more power to the local 
labour offices. This will not however give more power to the 
local political bodies. 
Which alternative we will choose in the actual experiment, 
is a political question linked to how strong and with what 
degree of certainty government wants to control the outcome 
of national labour market policy. 
8. NOTES ON THE CONTENT OF THE GREEK LABOUR MARKET 
POL ICY 
by Costas N.~~anellopoulos (Greece) 
One of the main topics of our seminar is the possibility and 
content of a prospective labour market policy. As the dis- 
tributed paper convincingly notes there are good reasons for 
formulating and pursuing an active labour market policy. The 
same paper describes concisely the principles and features 
of such a policy for The Netherlands. 
Even though the principles and the targets of labour market 
policy usually differ from country to country, because of 
differences in the acuteness of the various labour problems 
and the priorities given by the governments in power, it 
appears that the issues dealt in the distributed paper are 
as relevant for the case of Greece. Although Greece, a small 
and internationally open economy, differs from the continen- 
tal European countries regarding its economic level and 
structural features, it currently shares many common labour 
market problems, which have become more salient in the 
1980's. In Greece unemployment has risen (from 4.0% in 1981 
to 7.4% in 1987), the wage structure has become compressed 
and aggregate wage inflation was among the highest in Europe. 
In analyzing the growth of open unemployment in Greece, 
which by European standards doesn't seem very high, one has 
to look at the influence of the demand and supply of labour 
forces and on the other hand to examine the role of labour 
market rigidities. While up to 1981 participation rates of 
both men and women were falling, in the 1980's the partici- 
pation of youths in Athens and women as a whole rose sub- 
stantially increasing the total labour supply. From the 
demand side the near stagnation of the Greek economy since 
the second oil price shock clearly influenced the demand for 
labour negatively. The significance of these fundamental 
supply and demand forces imply that we cannot attribute 
solely the rise of unemployment to the labour market 
rigidities. 
Taking these points as correct it is clear that unemployment 
will not be eliminated unless the Greek economy achieves, 
again a remarkable GNP growth rate. Thus labour market 
problems and especially unemployment has to be the target of 
the wider economic policy. Rigidities are certainly impor- 
tant and policies to eliminate these would have favorable 
effects on employment. A better matching of skills and jobs 
automatically reduces frictional unemployment. Moreover, a 
smoothly operating market renders macro economic policy more 
effective in overcoming inflation and balance of payments 
problems. 
In the light of this brief analysis it is clear that real 
progress has been made towards restoration of macro economic 
equilibrium, through the 1986-1987 stabilization programme, 
and in making the labour market more adaptable in order to 
create extra jobs. At the macro economic level the counter 
inflationary modifications of the wage indexation system 
since October 1985 and the implied reduction of real minimum 
wages have ruptured the automatic link between price and 
wage movements and decreased the wage inflation. On the 
other hand industrial and regional policy has been designed 
with an aim to employment-intensive activities. Investment 
incentives discriminate in favour of both employment inten- 
sive activities and the less developed regions. A new scheme 
is established to help unemployed people to become self-em- 
ployed. New training programmes have been introduced for 
special categories of workers and workers in danger of 
losing their jobs. 
Although the outlined policy measures are in the right 
direction it has become clear that additional measures are 
required to solve the labour market problems. The low dis- 
persion of wage differentials and their recent secular 
narrowing (by industry, occupation, sex and age) raises 
questions for both the smooth operation of the labour market 
and the current re-entry after the two year stabilization 
programme. The penalization of high paid workers, through 
lower percentage wage increases than low paid workers, has 
caused problems for the efficient allocation of labour among 
skills and regions. Moreover, once incomes policy is abol- 
ished, wage increases probably become high.for those in the 
right side of the wage distribution. The 1988 restrictive 
incomes policy, through ceiling wage increases, has avoided 
reappearance of aggregate wage inflation. The currently 
proposed future incomes policy aims at linking wage changes 
to productivity changes at a micro level; thus helping 
flexibility. Such a wage system requires developed institu- 
tions of collective bargaining and should be designed in a 
way to prevent contribution to rigidities. To the extent 
that wage differentials do not reflect competitive forces 
and do not change according to labour shortages and sur- 
pluses, aggregate employment is lower than it could be. 
Over and above these features a comprehensive labour market 
policy in Greece has to include additional issues. Labour 
mobility in Greece seems to be inadequate and counter 
productive. Public and private sectors are rather segmented 
with little labour mobility between them. The public sector 
because of its relative higher average (monetary and non 
monetary) rewards attracts and employs the majority of 
university degree holders and boost demand for such a higher 
education. On the other hand, young university graduates ask 
for jobs in the public sector and the government creates 
additional posts. At the same time there are technical and 
professional unfilled'openings particularly in less devel- 
oped regions. The geographic mobility is towards the larger 
cities and thus deprives some regions of the labour required 
for their developments. Such mismatches between skills and 
jobs require adjustment of education and training to the 
return of human capital. Where the return is high education 
and training it should be expanded and where it is low it 
should be contracted. 
Related to these is the need for a proper evaluation of the 
special employment schemes in operation. They take the form 
of a recruitment subsidy in the private sector (22,000 job 
openings in 1986) and of short run employment of construc- 
tion workers by local government sector. It seems that 
expenditure of these measures is worthy in terms of employ- 
ment creation, impact on inflation and fairness. However, 
they perhaps prevent necessary adjustments and thus have a 
negative effect on long run productivity and output. 
Another issue is the rigidity of work patterns. Part time 
work is poorly spread. Few overtime hours are allowed per 
month, shift working and shop opening hours are restricted. 
Collective bargaining at enterprise level could settle less 
rigid work patterns. Finally, the current employment secu- 
rity provisions is believed to imply labour hoarding and 
thus lower labour productivity. Alternative arrangements, 
which share the burden of industrial restructuring, are 
currently proposed and discussed. 
9. UK LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
by Peter Brannen (United Kingdom) 
UK LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 
At the present time, the level of growth in the economy of 
the United Kingdom is well above that of most OECD coun- 
tries, and unemployment is falling rapidly. Since 1980 
productivity for the whole economy has grown at 2.75% per 
annum, similar to Japan and faster than in all other major 
industrialized nations. At the same time within the labour 
market there are historically high levels of unemployment, 
paradoxically coupled with a large number of job vacancies 
and falling number of the young people who are traditionally 
industry's source of new recruits. 
The UK population of working age is presently just over 
34 million and between 1975 and 1987 grew, on average by 
190,000 per annum. Between 1987 and 1995 it is projected to 
grow by only 240,000, and almost all of this will occur 
before 1990. During the same period (87-95), the civilian 
labour force will increase by 900,000: more than the popula- 
tion growth. This mainly reflects increased participation by 
women whose involvement will grow as the number of young 
people declines. The large number of job vacancies (approxi- 
mately 700,000) currently available is a sign of the rapid 
expansion of the economy, producing a shortage of labour in 
some regions (and in certain industrial sectors) whereas the 
decline in youth numbers reflects the end of the 1960's baby 
boom. 
The numbers of employed and unemployed, although constantly 
changing, provide the background against which these devel- 
opments must be viewed. The latest .available statistics show 
just over 25 million people employed in the British work- 
force of whom the vast majority (86%) were employees, two 
thirds of whom worked in service industries; 12% were 
self-employed, the remainder being either the armed forces 
or trainees on government programmes. As at August 1988, the 
total of people unemployed and claiming benefits was 
2.27 million or an unemployment rate of 8,0% of the total 
workforce. Of these, 948,000 (41%) had been unemployed for 
over a year and constituted the "long-term" unemployed. 
Although high by historical standards for the United 
Kingdom, this total has fallen continuously for the last 
25 months and is now at its lowest level for 7 years. 
UK LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
Government is determined not to repeat failed past attempts 
to reduce unemployment. Instead, an effective long-term 
strategy is being pursued. The objective is to exert con- 
tinued downward pressure on inflation through monetary 
policy, maintaining a firm financial framework supported by 
sound public finances, so laying the foundations for 
sustained growth and rising employment. Monetary policy is 
operated by a combination of interest rates, exchange rates, 
broad and narrow money supply and control of public 
finances; emphasis on these various means of control is 
varied over time, as appropriate. 
Government believe it is essential to improve supply perfor- 
mance and help create an enterprise culture, Privatization, 
encouraging the spread of wealth and ownership, and the 
removal of obstacles to the free functioning of markets all 
encourage a vigorous economy, higher ouput and more jobs. 
The reduction and simplification of taxes reduce distortions 
and markedly improves incentives. The easing of rigidities 
in the labour market (for instance through tax relief for 
profit related pay) encourages a better match of supply to 
demand for labour and so a faster creation of new jobs. In 
addition, further flexibility is being promoted by a rolling 
programme of deregulation, sweeping away excessive bureau- 
cratic restrictions: a policy designed to heighten competi- 
tion in all spheres of economic activity coupled with the 
abandonment of controls on prices, incomes and the movement 
of capital. 
These measures were intended to revitalize British industry; 
this in turn would require a more flexible and responsive 
labour market. 
Firstly, changes have been made in the area of industrial 
relations. Legislation has been introduced to redress the 
balance of bargaining power between employers and Trade 
Unions: the right for employers to manage has been restored. 
As well as this, government was concerned to ensure that 
trade unions truly reflect the beliefs and wishes of their 
members: it is now compulsory for unions to hold secret 
ballots of their members before embarking upon industrial 
action. 
Sec.ondly, emphasis has been laid on the promotion of small 
firms and an encouragement to self-employment. The 
Enterprise Allowance Scheme allows individuals cash help to 
start their own businesses: there were 106,000 entrants to 
this scheme in 1987/88. Overall, since 1979, self-employment 
has risen every year. Up to 1988, almost 1 million more 
people had become self-employed, an increase of over 50%, 
six times as much as in the previous 30 years. In addition, 
employment-creating industries, such as tourism, have been 
encouraged. 
Also, vocational training has been made a priority. With an 
economy expanding in the UK, it is of vital importance that 
it is not impeded by skill shortages. To this end the 
government is involved both in the provision of opportuni- 
ties for vocational training through national initiatives 
and also in encouraging firms to improve their internal 
training in order to meet the challenges of the market 
place. The Youth Training Scheme (YTS) provides training and 
work experience for school leavers over two years, including 
at least 20 weeks "off the job" training. 380,000 entrants 
are expected to this scheme in 1988/89. 
Employment Training (ET) offers up to a year's full-time 
training to 18-59 year olds who have been unemployed for 
6 months or more. ET will cater for 600,000 trainees per 
year at a cost of £1.4 billion. 
- These programmes form an important part of the opportunities 
available for vocational training but there exists a whole 
range of other government measures to aid the movement of 
individuals into employment; information, training, coun- 
seling and support are all available. An important part of 
this provision is Restart. This is open to everyone 
unemployed for 6 months or more and each is assessed in an 
interview designed specifically to identify an individual's 
particular need in relation to gaining employment. The most 
suitable of a wide range of opportunities is then offered. 
In 1987-1988 2.2 million interviews were conducted under the 
Restart programme. 
Finally, government has been concerned to improve incentives 
to work, and to better target help to those in need. With 
regard to employment, employers have been allowed to fix 
rates for the job; this has involved the repeal of 
schedule 11 of the 1975 Employment Protection Act, and the 
recission of the Fair Wages Resolution. In addition, the 
Wages Act has been reformed and young people under the age 
of 21 have been removed from its provisions. The qualifica- 
tion period for redress against unfair dismissal now stands 
at two years; at one point this was only six months. A 
powerful disincentive to the hiring of additional labour was 
the National Insurance Surchage (the so-called "tax on 
jobs") which stood at 3.5% in 1979. It has now been abol- 
ished. 
The tax-benefit system has also been overhauled and simpli- 
fied. Reforms to the Social Security system introduced 
earlier this year are intended to eliminate the unemployment 
and poverty traps by increasing incentives to work and 
concentrating state aid to those most in need. Over the last 
decade changes to taxation law have reduced the burden on 
those in lower paid jobs by the raising of tax-free 
allowances. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF UK LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
The policies already described have had a marked effect upon 
the UK economy, and upon the labour market in particular. 
- The UK economy as a whole is Strong, with GDP at its highest 
ever level and the country in its eighth successive year of 
growth (averaging 3% per annum) since 1980 the United 
Kingdom has grown faster than all of the other major 
European Community countries. Recently, inflation has shown 
a slight rise, but its control remains a central tenet of 
policy and action has been taken (by the raising of interest 
rates) to control this increase. 
Unemployment reached a peak in July of 1986 at 3.2 million 
or 11,5% of the workforce. Since then it has declined by 
about 900,000 in the longest sustained fall on record. The 
fall over the last year has been the fastest of all the 
industrialized countries. Employment has grown by 2.1 mil- 
lion since March 1983. Of these new jobs, l million are 
employees, 0.75 million are self-employed and 0.33 million 
extra people are working on government training schemes 
(counted as employed under International Labour Organization 
guidelines). This success is the result of the application 
of a consistent economic strategy througout the last decade. 
It is the intension of government that this record of 
achievement continue into the future. 
10. EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN FRANCE UP TO 2000: 
THE CHALLENGE OF SERVICE ACTIVITIES 
by Michel Gaspard (France) 
Since the first oil shock, industrial branches are regularly 
reducing employment in France, as well as in other European 
countries. In the new economic context service sectors seem 
to be the only ones able to generate high quantities of 
jobs. Are tertiary activities the only future job providers? 
If the answer is "yes", it has to be taken into account for 
defining and implementing new employment policies. And the 
answer is probably "yes". This paper summarizes and comments 
a few results of scenarios which were published in an 
article at the end of 1987, and in a book during the spring 
of 1988 (1). 
CONTINUED SLOW GROWTH, OR GROWTH RENEWAL? 4 SCENARIOS 
Figure 1 presents 4 scenarios of economic growth up to 2000, 
splitting the French economy in two blocks of activities: 
"material" activities on one hand (agriculture, manufac- 
turing and building), "immaterial" (services) activities on 
the other side. They can be quickly described as follows: 
in scenario 1 the world economic context remains rather 
slack in the nineties, and the international competition 
for manufactured goods markets increases. The internal 
economic and social policy is in continuity with the 
eighties; 
in scenario 2 the world context is the same, but 
internal specific policies succeed in accelerating the 
development of service economy (public and private), 
with respect to the macro equilibrias; 
the 3rd scenario describes a durable recovery of the 
world economy in the nineties, and an acceleration of 
(1) M. Gaspard: 
- Les services contre le chdmage: 4 scenarios pour un 
fin de siecle, Futuribles, november, 1987. 
- Les services contre le chdmage, Edition Gyros, 1988. 
international trade: the industrial production acceler- 
ates in France and the service activities too in about 
the same proportions; 
- scenario 4 assumes a similar world context as sce- 
nario 3, with specific policies oriented to tertiary 
development, as seen in scenario 2. 
In all scenarios the growth of the volume of value added in 
the "material" sector remains quite slow (between 2 and 3% 
per year in the most optimistic hypotheses), and is faster 
in the service branches all together (ranging from 3 to 7% 
per year). The GNP average growth ranges from 2.3% a year in 
scenario 1, to 5.4% in scenario 4. Table 1 shows the 
increasing weight of tertiary activities in the national 
production, passing from 61% in 1987 to 70% - or even 
more - in 2000. Service sectors, in all scenarios, contri- 
bute for more than 85% to the general growth, as they did 
nce 1974. 
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EMPLOYMENT WILL COME FROM THE SERVICE BRANCHES 
Table 2 shows the consequences of these 4 growth scenarios 
in terms of aggregate employment. Agriculture and other 
"material" branches continue to destroy jobs (about 100.000 
a year probably). Service branches continue to create jobs,. 
depending on the growth rate of the tertiary sector, which 
becomes the main determinant of aggregate employment. The 
share of employment in tertiary sectors passes from 63% in 
1983 to nearly three quarters in 2000, in all scenarios. 
These somewhat surprising evolutions are quite easy to 
understand. In the "material" branches, the growth rate of 
productivity has to be high by necessities of competi- 
tiveness and modernization, and remains permanently higher 
than the growth rate of value added. In the service activi- 
ties, the growth rate of value added can be much higher (as 
it has been already), and the slower growth of apparent 
productivity results in continuously creating jobs. 
Quantitative description of the evolution of unemployment is 
not given here, but only showed in the following graphic, 
where unemployment is presented as the difference between 
the aggregate labour force and the aggregate employment. 
A NEW CONTEXT FOR EMPLOYMENT POLICIES 
This continuous and accelerated shift of economic activity 
and occupations towards services will surely draw a new 
context for renewed "active" employment and labour market 
policies, which should give more and more attention to the 
tertiary sector in all fields, enterprises and job creation, 
costs and wages, skills and training, work organization and 
working conditions, social services, etc. The last part of 
this paper limits itself in pointing out a few questions 
about the conditions and possible circumstances of an 
acceleration of activity and job creation in the various 
service branches. 
- Which branches will be mostly job creative? 
A frequent answer to this question is: industrial 
services, information services and services to enter- 
prises such as high tech-services, research, counselling 
and consulting data processing and so on. In the case of 
France (and probably other countries), the answer seems 
to be different: more than 60% of the tertiary jobs are 
nowadays concentrated in household services, public and 
collective services, which will probably create nearly 
two thirds of the total number of new services jobs. 
Industrial and professional services will play a primary 
role for the modernization of industries, for exports 
and high-skilled job creation; but a secondary role in 
terms of quantity of job creations. 
- How will the equilibria between public and private, 
profit and non-profit activities evolve? 
This is a question concerning national policy choices. 
It is important to see (cf. for example M. Rein and 
R. Freeman's paper about "The Dutch Choice") that 
several ways exist for developing household and collec- 
tive services - for example the US-way, with high 
proportions of private and profit making services, and 
the Swedish way, with a lot of state and public decen- 
tralized services. The "French way" will probably be 
something special, a subtle cocktail of public, private 
and."third sector" (associative) services with dif- 
ferent proportions among the service branches (health, 
education, transports, communications, culture, housing, 
etc.), which will depend on pressures of public opinion, 
functioning of democracy and public choices, much more 
than on technical evolutions. It is necessary to 
emphasize, anyway, that social policies should be seen 
for the future as an important piece of employment and 
labour market policies, as Martin Rein points out; and 
further, as an important piece of economic development 
policies. 
How could the development of the service activities be 
financed in the future? That is a fundamental question. 
A general remark firstly: the question of "public" and 
"private" financing is very distinct from the question 
of "public" and "private" service-providing; just 
because a lot of public collective services use a lot of 
private financing (public transportations, telephone, 
public TV-broadcasting, etc.), while some private or 
associative services rely upon public financing (private 
health care and private schools in France, for example). 
This kind of interpenetrations and mixings will grow in 
the future rather than be reduced. 
Another general remark: this question has to be con- 
sidered at the same time on the supply side and on the 
demand side - what is convened to call a "two-handed 
approach". On the supply side it will be necessary to 
develop new circuits for saving collecting and invest- 
ment financing, adapted to different types of services 
which have to be created on local or regional bases; at 
the same time, it will be necessary to make more effi- 
cient the various public services, especially by decen- 
tralization of management and (sometimes) financing. 
Anyway, new policies should be developed for financing 
the supply of public and private services. On the demand 
side the main question is how to increase the effective 
(solvent) demand. The real costs of service producing 
will increase, so only two ways are available: reducing 
prices, and increasing direct or indirect incomes. 
Reducing prices can be obtained either by low-wage 
policies in the service activities (deunionization, 
deregulation - the US-way), or by public policy measures 
(subventions, lower taxes and social contributions in 
the developing service activities and so on. A faster 
increase of household incomes is surely a very important 
condition; an important question, for the next years, 
will be how to make that consistent with maintaining low 
rates of inflation and balances of payment equilibria. 
11. WAGE DIFFERENTIATION IN POLAND 
by Michal Malawski (Poland) 
In this paper I would like to make a brief comment on the 
wage differentiation in Poland. During the last several 
years it has become one of the most serious problems of the 
economy. 
The inter-branch differentiation within the same profes- 
sional groups. They reflect mainly some administrative 
preferences for certain branches and discrimination of 
some others. The most influential branches of the 
economy, i.e. mining, metallurgy, has long offered 
relatively attractive wages so as to maintain certain 
required level of employment. The point is that not only 
miners or steel workers, but also the custodial staff, 
as secretaries, drivers, telephonists, are paid very 
well in comparison with other branches. In 1986 the 
average pay of this staff was 2-2.5 times as high as the 
average of the same professions in the whole economy. 
The worst paid sectors were health service and education. 
2. The inter-enterprise differentiation within a branch. 
There are 2 main reasons of this differentiation. First, 
one of the objectives of the economic reform is that 
"good" enterprises should be able to pay higher wages 
than "badn ones. There are many reasons, such as lack of 
market prices and of real exchange rate, general dis- 
equilibrium in the economy, improper financial para- 
meters etc., for which the correlation between effi- 
ciency and value added is rather weak. Thus, it is 
better to talk about "rich" and "poor" enterprises. And 
there are, of course, "rich" and "poorn enterprises 
within every branch. It should be added that the corre- 
lation between wages and profits is not strong too. 
3. The inter-professional differentiation. The general 
tendency is that wages of qualified specialist are low 
as compared with wages of manual workers. It is caused 
by the natural labour market mechanism as well as by 
some above mentioned central decisions aimed at reducing 
the growth of wages. The wage structure within the 
industry is generally dictated by the labour market, but 
the level of wages in health service, education, juris- 
diction and state administration is set by administra- 
tive decisions. It is the labour market that sets the 
wage of a non-qualified worker at higher level than a 
high-school graduate engineer wage in the same enter- 
prise (in 1986 the average wage of a house painter was 
nearly 20 per cent higher than the average wage of a 
constructor). But it is the central administration that 
sets the wage of a doctor or lawyer in a training period 
below the level of a footboy wage. 
At first sight the situation looks strange, but it can 
be easily explained. There are many qualified engineers 
and technicians in Poland, too many for the stagnant and 
non-innovative economy, which first needs manual labour. 
Besides, it is easier for the government to hold up the 
teachers0 or doctors0 wages than to appose the miners', 
shipyards0 or steelworkers' demands. 
4 .  The inter-sectoral differentiation. Wages in the quickly 
developing private sector are 1.5-2.5 times higher than 
in the state enterprises. The private sector firms are 
much more efficient and sell their products (or ser- 
vices) at market prices. Thus, they are able to pay 
higher wages. 
In sum, even the differentiations within the state sector 
place Poland among the countries with strong dispersion of 
wages. According to some estimations, this dispersion is 
stronger than in any European country. And still it amounts 
only to a small part of income inequalities in Poland. If we 
take into account that the wage differentiations are largely 
accidental, and most sources of high income reflect rather 
the pathology of the central planning and unsound policy 
(e.g. absurdally high black market rate of dollar) than any 
economical activity in common sense, it becomes clear that 
social tensions are high and work discipline lax. But it 
- cannot be different in a country when $1.000 earned abroad 
by a student during his/her summer holidays equals to more 
than 40 average monthly wages in the state sector of the 
Polish economy (this wage is now about 50.000 zloties; the 
free market, or black market, rate of dollar rose from 
700 zloties in the beginning of 1987 to 1400 zloties in the 
beginning of 1988, 2300 zloties in the end of August this 
year, and is expect to reach 3.000 zloties by the end of the 
year). This rate brings catastrophic consequences to the 
labour market because it enhances (especially young) people 
to work abroad and do nothing after coming back. And doing 
nothing may take different forms, because everybody has the 
"right to work", i.e. to be employed. If we place Poland at 
the figure 1 of the discussion paper, it would have Swedish 
rate of employment to population 16-64 and American, or even 
greater, dispersion in wages. Still, as we mentioned, the 
reasons of dispersion are usually different than in Western 
countries and rate of employment also cannot be compared, 
since up to 20 per cent of employed is hidden unemployment. 
All these facts may be surprising for outsiders. It is often 
thought that in the centrally planned economies real wages 
are low, but slightly differentiated. At least in the Polish 
case, the average in fact is low, but the dispersion quite 
high. 
12. THE TRIPARTIATE APPROACH IN FINNISH INCOMES POLICY 
by Seppo Moisio (Finland) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT YEARS 
Economic performance has been rather favorable in Finland in 
the 1980s. GDP growth has been 3% per cent on average during 
the past ten years. The rate of unemployment has now been 
reduced below 5 per cent of the labour force. The share of 
public expenditures of GDP has risen but remains still at a 
reasonable level, 41 per cent in recent years. The gross 
debt of the public sector has, however, not exceeded 15 per 
cent in relation to GDP, and the share of net debt is a half 
of that. The deficit on current account has also so far been 
rather limited. The rate of inflation in Finland has, how- 
ever, been higher than in our competitor countries. Thanks 
to rapid increase in manufacturing productivity (5 per cent 
per year from 1977 to 1987) price competitiveness of manu- 
facturing has not deteriorated substantially as Finland has 
followed a stable exchange rate policy. Earnings have 
increased by 2 per cent in real terms on average since 1977. 
CENTRALIZED WAGE NEGOTIATIONS 
In Finland there is a centralized wage negotiation system as 
both sides - employees and employers - are highly organized. 
As a result centralized incomes policy agreements have nor- 
mally been aimed at and with some exceptions also reached. 
Increasing critisism has, however, been raised against the 
centralized negotiation system, because this process does 
not allow enough flexibility in wage and salary formation 
and structure. Negotiated wage agreements reached at the 
central level have also in general been exceeded at union 
levels. The central organizations have no more any formal 
control over agreements made at local or union levels. On 
the other hand if centralized agreements are not made, 
social partners cannot expect any contribution from the 
government in the bargaining process. In general it is 
thought that centralized agreements would guarantee better 
industrial peace and economic performance in Finnish 
economy. For many years trade unions and also employers have 
tried to bind the government's hands in taxation policy or 
at least to obtain some guarantees or commitments on eco- 
nomic policies to be followed by the government and the 
central bank during the contract period. The real wage after 
deduction of income taxes has increasingly been an important 
target for trade unions in the bargaining process. Many 
social policy and industrial relations reforms have origi- 
nated in the context of the centralized bargaining process 
during past decades. 
WAGE AND SALARY AGREEMENTS IN FEBRUARY 1988 
In February 1988 no centralized agreement was reached and 
negotiated wage agreements were made at union levels for two 
years. In most contracts the increase of wages and salaries 
was agreed only for 12 months. Wage increases were, however, 
so high that the rate of inflation has clearly accelerated 
in recent months and will be higher than in our competitor 
countries. As a result price competitiveness is estimated to 
deteriorate more than 5 per cent this year. A favorable 
trend of output growth and employment threatens to turn in a 
weakening direction next year. The deficit on current 
account is growing and increasing imbalances of the economy 
are threatening seriously employment. 
STABILIZATION AGREEMENT IN AUGUST 1988 
In this situation a new tripartiate approach was found in 
August 1988. Instead of tight fiscal policy the rate of 
inflation will be reduced by the combination of low wage and 
salary increases and income tax reductions. A new element in 
this stabilization agreement is that a real increase of 
2% per cent is officially set as a major target. The stabi- 
lization agreement was signed by all central labour market 
organizations, and a four weeks time limit was set for 
unions to accept the agreement. In the same connection the 
government promised to reduce income taxes so much that the 
target set for the real increase of wage earners' available 
- 101 - 
income will be reached. Main characteristics of the economic 
incomes policy package are: 
wages and salaries will be raised by 68 FIM per month or 
at least by 1 per cent from 1st March 1989; 
index clause: if the increase of consumer price index 
from September 1988 to December 1988 is higher than 
1,2 per cent and if the increase of CPI during 1989 is 
higher than 4 per cent, the exceeding part will be 
compensated to wage earners by employers; 
earnings development guarantee: if wages and salaries in 
some branches are lagging behind the general develop- 
ment, the difference (max 0,70 FIM/h) will be paid 
afterwards; 
income taxation: the government will present such 
propositions to the Parliament on income taxes and 
-income transfers to households that the real increase of 
2% per cent in wage earners' available income will be 
realized; 
indirect taxes: will be kept mainly unchanged, and 
tariffs and charges important to households will be 
raised only marginally; 
resources for adult retraining will be increased; 
the government pr0mise.d to make some improvements in 
social policy (day care, child allowances, unemployment 
security); 
a wish was presented to the central bank for a reduction 
of interest rates; 
if any partner (union) will not accept the stabilization 
agreement, the index clause cannot be applied to the 
wage agreement made by this partner; 
a folow-up: the representatives of the government and 
social partners will meet in October 1989, to consider 
the materialization of the real income target as well as 
the development of employment, prices, current account 
and taxation. Income information committee, which is 
composed of representatives of the authorities and the 
social partners, will provide necessary statistical 
information (this committee, which was established 
already 16 years ago, meets regularly and considers and 
agrees on all factual information (statistics, fore- 
casts) necessary in the incomes policy proceduce in 
Finland). 
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13. CENTRALIZATION OF WAGE BARGAINING, THE SIZE OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR AND HEALTH CARE COSTS 
by Kalevi Luoma and Heikki Palm (Finland) 
WAGE BARGAINING SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
There are great differences between mature industrialized 
societies in meeting such policy goals as low inflation, 
high employment and high economic growth. Recent evidence 
suggests that labour market institutions and systems of wage 
negotiation can explain a major part of differences in 
unemployment and inflation between advanced economies. 
Wage bargaining systems can be classified according to how 
centralized the decision making in labour market is. Classi- 
fication criteria can be based on: 
- unionization rate of employees and employers; 
- centralization of wage bargaining; 
- consensus of labour and capital; 
- the role of government in the bargaining process. 
By using these criteria one can derive an index describing 
the degree of corporatism in the economy. Appendix 1 shows 
how 17 advanced OECD-countries rank according to the index 
constructed by Calmfors and Driffill (1987). 
Countries can roughly be divided into three main types: 
1. countries with corporative negotiation system. This 
includes, for example, Austria and Scandinavian coun- 
tries, where unionization rate for workers is high, wage 
bargaining is carried out centrally and comprehensively, 
consensus between labour and capital is generally 
reasonably good and government has a major role in 
advancing wage negotiations; 
2. countries where wage negotiations are to a large extent 
carried out in firm level. This includes such countries 
as United States, Canada, Japan and Switzerland. Common 
to them is that unionization rate is low and government 
plays at most a minor role in advancing negotiations; 
3. countries with fragmented industry wide negotiation 
system. This includes West Germany, France, Italy, 
United Kingdom and Benelux countries. In these countries 
unionization rate and the rol of central employer and 
employee organizations is minor than in countries with 
central and comprehensive wage bargaining systems. Often 
the employer must negotiate with many trade unions, 
which may compete with each other. 
It has been noted that countries which can be classified 
into two first groups have produced higher employment and 
lower unemployment levels in the late seventies and eighties 
than countries within the third group without faring worse 
in combatting inflation. The meeting of conventional macro 
economic goals in different countries can be illustrated 
with figure 1. 
As can be expected the development of income distribution in 
countries with corporative negotiation system has been more 
equal than in other countries. In these countries differ- 
ences in productivity between firms have not have a great 
impact on wage dispersion. In countries with decentralized 
wage setting the wage dispersion is much wider. Generally 
there seems to be a strong association with corporatism and 
wage dispersion, Norway being an exception (.Leepanen, 1988). 
In countries with a centralized wage negotiation system 
government often contributes to the establishment of an 
agreement by incentives and sometimes by sanctions. In 
Finland government participated in most comprehensive income 
agreements by promising social income transfers or tax 
reliefs on the condition that most trade unions will accept 
the agreement. During the 1970s and 1980s a number of major 
social security and income maintenance reforms were agreed 
in the context of centralized incomes policy agreements. 
It also seems that there is a relation between the growth of 
public sector as an employer and the degree of corporatism. 
This is implied by figure 2, which shows the relationship 
between the share of public expenditure of GDP and the 
degree of corporatism. 
So it is likely that in countries with centralized and com- 
prehensive system of collective bargaining government has 
not only the role of an intermediary but it also pays for 
attainment of industrial peace. The result is the growth of 
public expenditure. One could also hypothesize that in coun- 
tries with centralized wage setting practices the solidar- 
istic wage policy increases the wage growth in public 
sector, even though productivity development there would be 
modest, thus rapidly increasing the costs of public services. 
Next we shall make a preliminary attempt to investigate 
whether there is a relation between the wage bargaining 
system adopted and the unit costs of health services. 
WAGE NEGOTIATION SYSTEMS, PUBLIC HEALTH CARE AND COST OF 
HEALTH SERVICES 
The way health care is organized, produced and financed 
varies considerably across countries. Table 1 presents an 
attempt to classify countries according to the type of wage 
negotiating system and the type of health care provision and 
financing. 
In countries with centralized wage determination health care 
is mainly financed by taxes. Countries for which industry 
wide wage bargaining is common, finance their health ser- 
vices to a great extent with some sort of sickness insur- 
ance. The United Kingdom is a clear exception. There health 
care is almost totally financed by taxes. In countries where 
wage agreements are made as a rule on the firm level, like 
the United States and Switzerland, production and financing 
of health care is based to a large extent on private 
schemes. However, in Japan and Canada, also public provision 
and funding are important. 
There seems to be a relation between the degree of corpo- 
ratism in the wage negotiation system and the share of 
public expenditure of the total health care expenditure, as 
figure 3 illustrates. The United Kingdom is again an excep- 
tion in this respect. 
- In studies in which variations in health care costs between 
OECD-countries have been compared, was found that GDP per 
capita explains most of the variation. Other potential 
explaining factors are the share of the public expenditure 
of the total health care expenditure, the number of hospital 
beds available for the population and the share of elderly 
population (OECD 1987). 
It has been suggested that the reason why total health care 
costs per capita are lower in countries with public funding 
and provision of health services might be due to the fact in 
these countries it is easier to control costs and adminis- 
trative costs are also lower. It has also been noted that 
the degree of centralization in funding and allocating 
health care resources affects costs development. If decision 
making is centralized, like in United Kingdom and Finland, 
it is easier to contain costs by regulating the volume of 
resources and prices. It could be argued that in countries 
with centralized wage negotiation system this system 
provides yet another instrument for restraining the growth 
of health care expenditure (Pekurinen and Luoma 1986). 
HEALTH CARE COSTS IN FINLAND 
In fixed prices health care costs in Finland have grown 
approximately by 6-7 percent a year, somewhat more rapidly 
than in OECD-countries on average. The rise in the health 
care share of GDP can be a result of allocating more real 
resources to health care but it can also result from factor 
prices rising more rapidly in health services than elsewhere 
in the economy. In Finland the rising GDP share of health 
care from 1960 to early eighties has been due to devoting 
more real resource to health services. The rise in price 
index of health care has not been more rapid than rise in 
the price index of GDP (Hakkinen 1988). 
Health care is a very labour intensive activity. About 
70 percent of health expenditure is due to personnel costs. 
In the economy as a whole the share of labour costs is 
considerably lower, about 50 percent. In general the costs 
- of labour intensive services tend to rise more than the 
costs of goods production. In Finland the earnings of health 
care personnel rose more slowly than average earnings from 
1965 to 1980. During 1980s the earnings growth of health 
care personnel has been somewhat more rapid than the average 
(see figure 4). 
The modest earnings growth of health care personnel has made 
it.possible to increase real health care resources in 
Finland in a way that has not led to a very rapid increase 
in the GDP share of health care costs. It seems that cen- 
tralized wage negotiation system has played a role in 
keeping the rise in personnel costs in control in public 
sector as whole. From 1965 to 1985 average earnings of 
public sector employees rose some 20 percent less than 
average earnings of all wage and salary earners. The main 
reason has been that in public sector there has not occured 
such a wage drift as in the private sector, where wage in- 
creases agreed in central agreements have been exceeded on 
average by some 40 percent. Another reason has been that 
expanding public sector has recruited increasingly those 
personnel groups which earnings level is lower than the 
average. 
The development in recent years indicate that allocating 
more real resource to public service production will result 
in more rapid increase in public expenditure than in the 
past. For instance, health expenditure is nowadays increas- 
ing quite rapidly in Finland. The share of health clearly 
under the average of OECD-countries but reached it in 
already in 1985. Recent acceleration in the growth of health 
care costs can also be inferred from figure 5, which showd 
the development of the number of health care personnel, a 
crude measure of output and expenditure for Finnish health 
centres from 1975 to 1986. 
It seems evident that in the future, it is not possible to 
the same extent as before to rely on increase in health care 
personnel and other resources to meet the rising expecta- 
tions, demand and need for health services. More attention 
has to be devoted to the resources that the health care 
sector already has. We need to ask among other things, can 
the volume of quality of services be increased by improving 
the producti.vity and efficiency of health care? In addition 
to cost considerations this kind of change in emphasis in 
health care policy is needed because in the future it will 
become increasingly difficult to recruit young people in 
health services. The age structure of the population is 
changing and the number of new entrants into the labour 
market is diminishing at the same time. 
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provision/ of Genaany Canada 
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- 14. THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE WELFARE STATE: IMPLICA- 
TIONS FOR REDISTRIBUTION POLICIES 
by Simon Miles (Canada) 
INTRODUCTION 
The introductory note to the seminar, circulated by the HRWB 
on 21st March, 1988, suggested that we should look at the 
evolution of the welfare state in the Netherlands, as com- 
pared with other countries and the implications,of this for 
redistribution policies and, in particular, for the role of 
social policies. 
This suggests a three-step procedure. Unfortunately, the 
background paper does not take us through this procedure. It 
focuses on the labour market. In struggling to come to grips 
with what might be a useful contribution to the seminar, I 
have concluded that it would be beneficial for us to discuss 
the following. 
1. What do the Dutch want of the development process? 
2. What are the dimensions and main features of the oper- 
ating environment in which they will be striving to 
realize their expectations? 
3. What, therefore, do the Dutch want of the welfare state 
and what are the implications of this for policy and 
structural change? 
In short, we have to start with a sense of direction, or at 
least a discussion on how it is to be determined, and then 
we have to look at the context before we can focus on any 
one set of policies. My notes here are designed with this 
procedure in mind. They do not pretend to offer a systematic 
coverage of issues. I have given particular attention to the 
labour market, but hopefully it is clear that the framework 
can be used to elaborate the implications for other policy 
sets. 
WHAT DO PEOPLE WANT OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS? 
While we visitors cannot presume to know what the Dutch 
people want, we can hopefully help elicit this from our 
hosts. 
When we first discussed the changing role of the welfare 
state, in Sweden in 1985, I suggested that we needed a 
definition of development (1). I see this as necessary 
because the concept of development has been evolving in 
public policy discussion in recent years. 
To summarize, I suggested that since the industrialized 
countries began to construct their welfare system in the 
late "Forties", we have seen a paradigm shift relative to 
understandings of development. The concept has shifted from 
one which emphasized the economic and technological develop- 
ment of the country, with social development being viewed as 
a residual, to a concept which is more balanced and places 
much more attention on the development of the individual and 
on society. Economic and technological development are 
gradually, but only very gradually, beginning to be seen 
more in a supportive role of this human development. 
Development is also beginning to be seen more in terms of a 
continuing process. I would like to suggest that the contin- 
uing development of an individual is the process of enrich- 
ment of experience and improvement in the quality of one's 
ligatures (associations, ties etc.) and thus ability, not 
only to survive, but to respond to new situations in a 
spontaneous and creative way. This enrichment of experience 
is seen to derive from the continuing interaction with one's 
surrounding developmental environments (or components of 
one's developmental setting). The opportunities to interact 
is dependent on the options open. Diversity of opportunities 
is therefore important. The quality of the ligatures with 
people, places and things are also dependent upon the 
options open for interaction but at the same time, upon an 
ability to be selective in time spent with those people, 
places and things which provide greatest human fulfill- 
ment (2). 
Societal development is in many senses individual, develop- 
ment writ large with an emphasis being placed upon the 
internal linkages (between its member individuals and groups 
and with the natural environment) that constitute the sup- 
port systems, be they economic, social, technological or 
whatever. The stronger the linkages or ligatures, the 
stronger the cohesion in society. 
However, while internal linkages do constitute the most 
important linkages for societal development, the linkages 
along the external dimensions of time and space are also of 
increasing significance. A society owes much of its develop- 
ment to its interactions with other societies in its global 
space and, increasingly, there is a growing consciousness of 
the "linkage of responsibility" towards the continuing 
society. Global viability and substainability of development 
strategies is therefore important. The tremendous appeal of 
the Brundtland Commission that has promoted environmentally 
sound development bears out this point. 
Although these may be regarded as highly conceptual dimen- 
sions of societal development, they are mentioned here 
because they help to identify what it is that individuals 
and groups need in order to pursue their development in a 
self-reliant manner. 
Thus one can envisage that people are going to seek not 
simply work but lifestyles that provide them with a greater 
degree of enrichment and the opportunities to enjoy their 
pleasurable ties with people, places and things. This is 
showing up, for example, in the reluctance of the labour 
force to respond to the labour market instruments designed 
to provide mobility. 
The Dutch participants should attempt to outline some of the 
key values that the Dutch people are expressing relative to 
the labour market and the provision of public services. This 
should go beyond social services because we are also inter- 
ested in new responsibilities and trade-offs that have to be 
made in satisfying multiple goals. 
WHAT ARE SOME OF THE KEY FEATURES OF THE CHANGING OPERATING 
ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH PEOPLE SEEK TO SATISFY THEIR EXPECTA- 
TIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS? 
These features are listed in point form only. Hopefully, 
their implications are clear. There are obviously many more. 
This is to give a sense of why it is important to understand 
the changing context. My sense is that they are features of 
most, if not all industrialized countries. They include 
changing attitudes. 
A fast-evolving world economy in which increasing impor- 
tance is being given to: 
- mobility of capital (repatriation of profits) 
- knowledge and retraining (which means that those 
without appropriate training receive very low wages 
and do not advance). 
Increasing individualization of lives with more house- 
holds seeing both adult partners working and more 
children taking part-time jobs with longer hours. 
Increasing consumer purchasing power driving up prices 
of goods (e.g. housing) and services (e.g. nursing). 
Increasing interest on the part of governments in taxing 
the consumption of goods and services (with obvious 
implications for the poor of this regressive taxation). 
Increasing reluctance on the part of employers (espe- 
cially those from two-breadwinner households) to move. 
Increasing numbers of people employed in their own or in 
small businesses. 
Declining union membership as people become better able 
to look after their own interests, given their special 
niches in production processes. 
Greater value being placed on children but not neces- 
sarily an accompanying increased sense of responsibility 
on the part of parents for the welfare of their children. 
Aging populations with all the attendant demands for 
services. 
10. Increasing value being given to environmentally sound 
development. 
11. Increasing consciousness of sharing one planet but 
little consciousness of the costs involved in providing 
for the indivisible benefits of protecting the natural 
heritage and the commons and conserving the nahral 
resources. 
12. Rapid global communication that is homogenizing people's 
demands upon the welfare state. 
Doubtless, there are some variations on the above, when 
applied to the Dutch. One important consideration is the 
attitude of Dutch mothers to participation in the labour 
force. 
WHAT DO PEOPLE WANT OF THE WELFARE STATE AS THEY SEEK TO 
REALIZE THEIR EXPECTATIONS IN THE RAPIDLY CHANGING OPERATING 
ENVIRONMENT? 
People appear to want two key things from the welfare state 
today: 
1. they want it to shift from being primarily a "provider" 
state to being an "enabling" state; 
2. they want it to provide for the indivisible benefits (of 
environmental protection, peace, etc.), though they 
don't appear to be conscious of what this involves (3). 
Regarding the enabling state, safety nets are still needed 
but even more important is the putting in place of "safety 
trampolines", that give people a chance to recover their old 
position or even improve on it. Safety nets still have a 
tendency to trap people. 
Where people need greatest enabling assistance is in making 
transitions, for example, in the labour market: 
- the transition for the welfare recipient into an attrac- 
tive job that results in a considerable increase in net 
income; 
- the transition from education to work for the first time; 
- the transition for the mother (especially the single 
mother) into the workforce; 
- the transition for older people out of the full-time 
workforce; 
- the transition to a society in which everyone is paid to 
work. 
In short, making a significant change in a fast-changing 
environment is challenging. But governments would do well to 
consider that people will only become more resourceful and 
better able to respond to future challenges if they are 
enabled rather than provided for. However, shifting public 
policy and programs from a "providing" role to an "enabling" 
role is, as is illustrated below, requiring more attention. 
These and other challenging transitions facing people trans- 
late into demands upon the welfare state. Some of the more 
important are the following. 
1. The need to improve the currently poor fit between 
income support, earned income and the tax system. Recent 
Canadian reforms to the tax system (that have reduced 
income taxes for the very rich and the very poor and 
shifted from tax exemptions to tax credits) have still 
not done enough to make the transition from welfare into 
paid employment attractive for most people. Such people 
generally become ineligible for subsidized housing. They 
begin to pay for unemployment insurance, the state 
pension scheme, health insurance, and an increasing 
share of child-care costs, plus the costs of going to 
work. Most jobs that they move to are low paying. They 
do not have pension plans or drug schemes. And they 
offer little opportunity for career advancement. For 
such people there is an effective marginal tax rate of 
almost 100 percent between public assistance at $ 10,000 
a year and employment at $ 13,000 or $ 14,000 a 
year (4). The minimum wage in Canada has dropped from an 
equivalent of about 52 per cent of the average wage in 
1976 to about 43 per cent in 1986. Thus, not sur- 
prisingly, between 1979 and 1986 the worker on minimum 
wage lost about 30 per cent of his purchasing power. 
A related need is to make it attractive to those 
receiving unemployment benefits to take part-time work, 
or full-time work, for a few weeks. Just how rapidly 
benefits should be reduced for part-time workers is an 
important question. The disincentives to temporary, 
full-time work are such that Canada imports large number 
of temporary workers to harvest fruit crops. 
2. The need to improve the fit between education and 
required training. There has been an improvement here 
with both the federal and provincial governments 
offering a variety of schemes for subsidizing jobs to 
provide work experience for both new entrants and the 
long-term unemployed. 
One of the biggest sectors of demand is for tool and die 
makers. These are required for the auto parts plants 
serving assembly plants financed by the highly mobile 
Japanese capital. The training of these skilled workers 
is largely paid for by employers. For example, it costs 
about $ 100,000 to train a tool and die maker. On 
average, the employer pays 85 per cent; the employee 
7 per cent and the federal and provincial governments 
pick up the other 8 per cent ( 5 ) .  
In Ontario, the provincial government has sanctioned 
67 apprenticeable trades, but this provides limited 
protection for the employer's investment. Beyond the 
risk of losing their investment in these expensive 
workers, the employers are particularly concerned about 
attitudes to work, as reflected in poor attendance. The 
employer's demand of the welfare state is to instill an 
attitude of diligence and responsibility into young 
people while at school. 
3. The need to assist the private sector with research and 
development and the creation of a supportive trading and 
investment environment. There is increasing support in 
Canada for the idea of governments being more active in 
assisting industrial R&D. Currently, government support 
covers 20% of industrial R&D (including both tax and 
non-tax support). The comparable figures are: USA 40 per 
cent; Britain 37 per cent; France 29 per cent; Germany 
24 per cent (6). I believe Japan is lower still: some- 
thing which raises a question as to whether the govern- 
ment is indeed well advised to get involved in sup- 
porting R&D. 
The creation of a supportive trading and investment 
environment has been pursued with considerable vigour by 
the current Canadian federal government. A "free-trade 
agreement" has been struck between Canada and the USA 
that will take effect if the Conservative Party is 
returned to power. Over 80 per cent of trade between the 
two countries is already "free". The removal of protec- 
tion for the remaining 2 0  per cent has sparked a heated 
debate that has become the central issue in the current 
federal election campaign. There will obviously be 
winners and losers. Nobody agrees on who they are and 
the extent of the gains and losses. More importantly, in 
terms of our discussions of the demands on the welfare 
state, there are serious concerns being voiced, by 
informed interest groups, about the implications of the 
free-trade agreement for the management of the natural 
resources. There is concern over: the demands that the 
USA can make on Canadian water (regarded as a tradable 
good under GATT); the pressure on Canadian farmers to 
use currently illegal hormones, pesticides and other 
chemicals to compete with US counterparts; the reduced 
ability to control energy resource management due to 
obligations to service USA consumers; and the continuing 
ability to subsidize forest replanting. 
The articulation of this concern is not surprising, 
given the increasing value attached to environmentally 
sound management. The point is that it is, in my view, a 
legitimate concern pertaining to a relatively new demand 
on the welfare state. It is illustrative of the competi- 
tion for limited funds that social programs will have to 
face. 
4 .  The need to assist in the establishment and financing of 
child-care services. The lack of spaces, in the public 
and private sector, and the need for subsidies, has 
become a major issue. A bill before the last Parliament 
died when the election was called. It was emphasizing 
support for privately provided services. It received 
mixed support/criticism from the interested public. 
5. The need to assist with literacy services. Canada has 
about 4 . 5  million adults functional illiterates (i.e. 
not able to get by in everyday life skills). This 
represents 24  per cent of all Canadians over 18 years of 
age. While it is only slightly higher in the immigrant 
population as compared with native born Canadian, the 
functional illiteracy rate for immigrants has risen 
rapidly since 1980 ( 7 ) .  
The Canadian federal government has recently announced a 
major program on this issue. It is mentioned here partly 
because it illustrates the type of demand on the welfare 
state that is fueled by the positive response of the 
state to the pressure to welcome refugees (exerted by 
organized ethnic groups in the body politic). 
Other transitions exist in other fields of public policy. 
The provision of the enabling services involved is often 
closely associated with the provision of "caring" services. 
For example : 
- nursing assistance for the elderly; 
- assistance to those with mental disabilities. 
Other enabling services are closely associated with the 
provision of services. For example: 
- the provision of half-way houses for criminals 
re-entering society; 
- the provision of services to control the sale and use of 
illegal, health-damaging drugs combined with the 
provision of services to ease addicts off drugs. 
In these areas the challenge for public policy is to 
identify the minimum effective contribution from the state. 
Canadian public policy does not appear to have done a good 
job in this regard. In Ontario, for example, we now have a 
great shortage of nurses and (according to the Ministry of 
Health) a surplus of doctors (8). This seems to have been a 
product of the relative strengths of the two groups in their 
power to bargain for salary increases or fee increases with 
the provincial government. We have also seen a great 
increase in poor prescribing practices since the time when 
government payment for pharmaceutical drugs was introduced. 
I should like to turn briefly from this discussion of the 
enabling state to the increasing demands for the provision 
of indivisable benefits from collective goods. This is well 
illustrated by reference to the environment. 
- There is a reluctance on the part of governments to take 
action that benefits others outside their jurisdiction. The 
age old mentality of "externalize your production costs" is 
taking time to change. The commons have been badly damaged 
from continuing abuse and this, combined with a rapidly 
increasing public awareness of the significance of this for 
the destruction of life on the planet, is leading to two 
types of action. 
The first is to seek divisible benefits. For example, an 
individual buys bottled drinking water. In this instance the 
polluted water source remains polluted, the cost of clean up 
remains and the political leverage for obtaining clean-up 
(provided by the fear of ill-health) is weakened. 
The second type of action is collective and involves the 
pursuit of the indivisible benefit. It is reluctant collec- 
tivism, especially when it involves international coopera- 
tion. But it has to rely on state intervention to raise 
funds, to legislate and to ensure that individuals become 
aware of, become equipped to, and do indeed live up to, 
their responsibilities. 
This intervention will, as Prime Minister Brundtland has 
made clear, require action across the board in the public 
sector and in the private and popular sectors. This reorien- 
tation of public policy in economic and social areas is 
likely to have a considerable effect on production 
processes, consumption patterns and, quite possibly, life- 
styles. Changes are taking place in Canada, but only very 
slowly. I gather that the Norwegian government has been 
introducing changes across the board. It would be inter- 
esting to hear about these and, more so, the process need to 
introduce the changes. Even for those participants inter- 
ested primarily in the labour market, or social services, 
such as health, there should be significant implications. 
IN CONCLUSION 
We are reaching a far more complex stage of government 
intervention in the processes of human and societal develop- 
ment, in large part because of the increased sharing of 
- responsibility with the private sector, individuals and 
groups. In addition, however, it is far more challenging to 
"enable" than to "provide for", if it is to be done effec- 
tively. Further, the increased demand for the pursuit of the 
indivisible benefits in the environmental field will inten- 
sify this complexity of intervention. The nature of the 
challenge is such that the choice facing the Dutch does not 
seem to be one of pursuing either the Swedish or de USA 
models, or necessarily remaining as is, but rather one of 
developing a role for the welfare state that best reflects 
the trade-offs between Dutch expectations and the options 
available in the operating environment. The making of the 
choices will require a reasonably well-informed public and 
an open system of debate. The Dutch electoral system and 
tolerance of dissent is a very valuable foundation for this. 
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15. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF SOCIETY 
by Erik de Gier (The Netherlands) 
All over Europese new inequalities are growing since the 
economic down turn of the seventies. Even the recovery of 
economic growth in the eighties didn't stop this develop- 
ment. In general the new inequalities appear as a process of 
social exclusion and new poverty of substantial numbers of 
citizens. At high risk are especially citizens with a rela- 
tively low earnings capacity on the labour market. Examples 
are the long-term unemployed, the disabled, the elderly and 
members of ethnic minority groups. 
The growth of inequality fits very well with the dominant 
economic ideology of privatization, market flexibility and 
less welfare state (Thatcherism, Reaganism). One of the main 
arguments of this ideology is that too much welfare provi- 
sions for the socio-economic weakest citizens is a drag to 
the economy. Thus from an economic point of view more 
socio-economic inequality in society is acceptable. 
Considering the new social problems on the one side and the 
recovery of economic growth on the other hand, a central 
question is how much inequality can be tolerated in a modern 
society. Does this development already today or perhaps in 
the near future surpass critical borders, or not? In my 
opinion the process of decline has to be stopped right now 
because it threatens the balance of the fundamental histor- 
ical compromise on social justice in our type of societies. 
Eversince the age of Enlightment there has been global con- 
sensus in western societies about a certain balanced combi- 
nation of solidarity and personal interest. This combination 
has formed a solid basis for an integrated and stable 
society. It has also made possible the development of polit- 
ical democracy (Tocqueville). 
Lasting imbalances of the equilibrium of solidarity and 
personal interest will probably not only endanger the neces- 
sary integration of society, but in the end also political 
democracy and western culture. Interrelations between the 
process of social exclusion and the increase of feelings of 
social deprivation, criminality, egoism, hedonism, political 
passivity, etc. are relevant signs. 
In my view there are two main strategies to reverse the 
exclusion process. These are: 
a. rebalancing the idea of social justice (i.e. balance 
between personal interest and solidarity); 
b. visualizing the financial and non-financial costs of the 
exclusion process for individual and society (external 
effects) . 
Ad. a 
At first sight rebalancing the idea of social justice is not 
a simple solution because there are different legitimate 
normative theories. Some theories stress the importance of 
solidarity and redistribution (Rawls); others the importance 
of personal interest (Nozick). What is needed is a leading 
idea which may inspire citizens to support the balance 
between solidarity and social interest. Such an idea existed 
directly after the Second World War, when Lord Beveridge and 
Marshall elaborated the idea of political and social 
citizenship. To them citizenship meant full membership of a 
community. During the welfare state period the idea of 
citizenship disappeared almost completely out of public 
debate. At present it seems to be the right moment to bring 
it back again in a modernized way. This especially means 
that citizenship, compared to the concept of the fifties, 
will nowadays have to take into account much more the 
increased pluriformity of society. The central goal of 
citizenship should be the inclusion of all individuals and 
groups in society. On the one side this means that all 
citizens should have rights on a combination of entitlements 
or entry tickets and provisions to have the opportunity to 
improve their life chances. On the other hand, citizens not 
only have rights but also certain duties, such as tax paying 
and performing voluntary work on behalf of society 
(Dahrendorf). In sum, citizenship may become the central 
ideology of future western societies. 
Ad. b 
The idea behind this strategy is that the visibility of the 
costs (external effects) of economic policies from a certain 
point may lead to corrective policies. There is a clear 
analogy with the start of the development of social policies 
during the last century. Then societal elites came into 
action when they were threatened by social revolutions or 
health diseases (f.e. epidemics in poor quarters). A t  the 
moment the majority of costs of economic policies are not 
directly visible or even denied. So it may be very important 
to develop an appropriate cost/benefit balance of the exter- 
nal effects of the economy. A problem in this respect is 
that not all costs will be quantifiable. Besides, it will 
not always be easy to prove the real causes (f.e. is unem- 
ployment a real cause of criminality, or not?). 
16. A WELFARE STATE OF SORTS; THE HUNGARIAN CHOICES 
by Peter A. Bod (Hungary) 
There are not three, but four types of welfare states in 
industrialized world. Eastern European socialist states, in 
general, and Hungary, in particular, were created as a kind 
of welfare states. Taking the level of welfare services into 
account, this may sound misleadingly tall talk. In fact, it 
is better to use the French equivalent of the term 
Etat-Providence. Historically speaking, continental nations, 
especially in Middle and Eastern Europe, have had a long 
tradition of active (entrepreneurial, servicing, regulating, 
etc.) state. 
Thus, the creation of a socialist welfare state in Hungary 
in the late 1940s was not without antecedents. An all-em- 
bracing employer and provider of social services, the state 
was also used as an instrument of party policy in order to 
wither autonomous interest-representing organizations of the 
civil society. However, the profound social transformation 
must also be credited for certain historical achievements 
such as 
- gradual elimination of mass unemployment through central 
price and wage policy and growth-oriented economics 
(which later led to highly problematic labour shortage); 
- inclusion of previously underprivileged, mainly rural, 
strata of society into social security, cultural, health 
care, and education networks. 
In recent years, the concept of omnipotent paternalistic 
state has been questioned in Hungary. First, the state has 
proved to be unable to fulfill former obligations. Cheap 
housing, e.g., has been gradually declining: while in the 
first part of the 1970s the share of state exceeded one 
third of total housing construction, this ratio dropped to 
22% in a decade, and to 13% by 1987. Scientific research and 
certain cultural services are now being transformed into 
commercial undertakings. This is, according to many, only to 
mask the unability of the state to provide adequate finance. 
Education and health care are invariably supposed to be free 
of charge, but lack of finance has led to deterioration of 
services and spread of anti-social practices (e.g. tips to 
doctors for adequate care). Second, malfunctions within 
centralized providing networks have manifested themselves 
over time, and public perception has recently turned against 
big government. 
In the labour market a new situation was created under the 
marketization and decentralization minded reform of 1968. As 
a result of the only successful economic reform of that time 
within COMECON, enterprise mangers (nota bene: executives of 
state owned firms) gained real managerial discretion in pay, 
bonus, and employment matters. Therefore, the post-1968 wage 
determination can be characterized by decentralized bar- 
gaining at factory level plus a strict central wage policy. 
The latter, in the form of downward pressure on wages and 
salaries, has been strongly felt in "first economyn business 
units, that is, in state owned firms, budgetary institutions 
and, to a lesser extent, agricultural and industrial cooper- 
atives. Wage policies have been, on the other hand, ineffi- 
cient in the "second economy" (private sector, part-time 
employment, household farming, etc.) and in "third economy" 
(underground, illegal activities). In consequence, social 
sector employment has been long losing significance in total 
money income of the population - and at a rate exceeding the 
relative contraction of the state sector (cf. Tables 1 
and 2). 
Table 1 Structure of money income in Hunaary (million Ft, at 
current ~ricesl 
Wages. salaries, bonuses 267.230 
(59,4) 
Misc. labour-incomes 32.631 . 
(7,3) 
Private business earnings 42.410 
(9,4) 
Pensions, soc.sec., stipends 87.024 
(19,3) 
Capital income, interests 20.786 
(4,6) 
GROSS MONEY INCOME 450.081 
(100,O) 
Author's calculation based on date of Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office. 
Table 2 Sectoral com~osition of GDP 
1. State sector 
2. Cooperatives /19.8/ /18.7/ 
17,O 23,6 23,O 23,O - 3. Household farming /3,2/ /4,3/ 
4. Auxiliary private business 6,6 3,1 3,7 6,6 
5. Traditional private sector 9,O 2,6 3,5 7,0 
Source: Hungarian central'statistical Office. 
The Hungarian society and economy have undergone major 
systemic changes in recent years. Since Gorbatchev's advent 
to power, reform forces in Hungary have gained ground, 
declaring to build up a (socialistic) market economy. At 
present, marketization and deregulation create unexpected 
side effects such as high inflation (Table 3), and a 
profound change in employment pattern. Intensity of labour 
- shortage is decreasing, and the first signs of (structural) 
unemployment have appeared. At present, the number of vacan- 
cies exceed those of searching jobs, but regional variances 
and the direction of changes offer a different picture (cf. 
Table 4). 
Table 3 Inflation and non-aaricultural waaes in Hunaary 
Net nominal wage Consumers' Real wage 
index price index index 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 
Table 4 Ratio of reported vacancies to iob seekers 
1st quarter 3rd quarter 1st quarter 








Source: Hungarian Labour Department, 1988. 
In mid-1988, there were 16 thousand unemployed and approxi- 
mately 40 thousand jobs offered. But, as the figures above 
- indicate, the trend points to a major change in labour 
market. 
What worries students of labour issues most is, first of 
all, lack of appropriate unemployment benefit; second, 
shortages and rigidities in housing markets, kindergartens, 
and other social services - a fact that hinders regional 
mobility; third, lack of tradition of retraining and change 
in profession - a consequence of past paternalistic state 
activity which weakens self-help and self-initiative values 
among employees. 
Decentralizing reforms since 1968 have weakened state agen- 
cies and strengthened the executive stratum. Corporatist 
interest-representing organizations such as Chamber of 
Commerce, Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives, and Trade 
Union Council also gained in influence. In today's Hungary 
threat of jobs and declining real wages may lead to demon- 
strations and strikes, like in the case of vine growers 
(June 1988) or miners (August 1988). Thus the balance of 
power between the state(party), corporatist bodies, and 
employees is in transition. 
It must also be added that the access to social protest 
mechanisms such as miners. In general, organizations 
representing producers wage earners tend to dominate the 
political arena at the cost of consumers and those outside 
corporatist organizations (pensioners, students, unem- 
ployed). There is a growing recognition that it is not 
further political decentralization through neo-corporatiza- 
tion, but through increased market competition, on the one 
hand, and parliamentary democracy, on the other, that offer 
the best chances for society-wide consensus building. 
It is, without doubt, premature to speculate about the 
future of socio-economic reforms in Hungary. The balance 
between public and private has been changing fast in recent 
years. Institutional changes are influenced by both geo- 
political conditions and inner learning process. Under the 
very specific politico-economic conditions, there is hardly 
any model for Hungary to borrow. 
Thus, the chances are also low that we might learn from the 
trials and errors of others, without committing some of the 
same mistakes. 
Are there any lessons from the Hungarian (or, for the 
matter, Dutch) case? Probably not in the sense of borrowing 
good solutions and avoiding mistakes committed elsewhere. 
What real life cases may contribute to policy decision 
making is to highlight strong interdependence between eco- 
nomics proper (allocative decisions, economic growth manage- 
ment) social policy, and social values and behavioral 
patterns. 
ANNEX 
- 141 - 
17. CONFERENCE PROGRAM 
Conference on "Intearation of social aspects in macro-eco- 
nomic plannina and ~olicv makinu", November 1988 
Wednesday November 2nd 
Chairman of the day: prof. Bernard van Praag, member of the 
WRR, The   ether lands 
Morning : 9.00 - 
9.30 - 
Meeting of the participants 
Formal opening of the conference by 
Joop van der Reijden, chairman of the 
HRWB, former Minister of Health 
Presentation of the participants 
Introduction by prof. Ad Geelhoed, 
member of the WRR, on the changing 
balance of public and private power in 
the Netherlands 
Coffee break 
Reaction by one of the participants 
Discussion 
Lunch at the Pulchri Studio 
Afternoon: 14.00 - Introduction by prof. Hans Adriaansens, 
member of the WRR, on the active labour 
market policy 
14.45 - Reaction by one of the participants 
15.00 - Discussion 
15.30 - Tea break 
15.45 - Discussion 
Evening : 18.30 - Reception at the WRR by prof. Wil 
Albeda, chairman of the WRR, former 
Minister of Social Affairs and Employ- 
ment 
19.00 - Dinner at the WRR 
Thursday November 3rd 
Chairman of the day: Peter Brannen (United Kingdom) 
Morning : 9.00 - Coffee 
9.30 - Introduction by prof. Martin Rein of 
the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology USA, on the relationship of 
labour market institutions and economic 
performance in different countries 
10.15 - Reaction by one of the participants 
10.30 - Discussion 
11.00 - Coffee break 
11.15 - Discussion 
12.00 - Lunch at the HRWB 
Afternoon: 13.00 - Visit to the museum "Mauritshuis" at 
the Hague 
15.45 - Trip' through the Amsterdam "canals" by 
boat 
Evening : 17.15 - Dinner in Amsterdam 
Friday November 4th 
Chairman of the session: Seppo Moisio (Finland) 
Morning : 9.00 - Introduction by Gerard Keijzers, member 
of the staff at the WRR, on "Scope for 
growth" 
9.45 - Reaction by one of the participants 
10.00 - Discussion 
10.30 - Coffee break 
10.45 - Discussion 
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Chairman of the session: Erik de Gier, member of the staff 
at the HRWB 
11.15 - Summary and evaluation of the confer- 
ence, introduced by one of the partici- 
pants 
Discussion about the 1989 meeting 
(theme and place) 
Reception at the HRWB . 
Lunch at the Pulchri Studio 
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